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This Technical Report includes the written works performed by the students based on the pa-
pers grouped as seminar of “Ad-Hoc Networks for Inter-Vehicle Communication” (VANETs).
Although it was the first time this seminar was offered, it attracted a large number of moti-
vated and diligent students, proving the high interest that VANETs have at the moment.
i
Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Daniel Schmidt:
Review of “Broadcast Reception Rates an Effects of Priority Access in
802.11-Based Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Philipp Woock:
Review of “Vehicle-to-Vehicle Safety Messaging in DSRC” . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Nils L. Roßmann:
Review of ”Centimeter Vehicle Positioning and Lane Keeping” . . . . . . . . 27
Gerrit Göbel:
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Preface
The seminar ‘Ad-Hoc Netzwerke für die Kommunikation zwischen Fahrzeugen’ (Ad-Hoc Net-
works for Inter-Vehicle Communication) has explored the innovative field of vehicular net-
works, also known as VANETs. Recently, VANETs have gained the attention of all, academia,
industry and people in general, thanks to some governments’ participation in projects world-
wide. This projects have as a main goal to improve safety on the roads and traffic flow.
In Germany, the ‘Network on Wheels’ (NoW) project started last year, June 2004, follow-
ing the successful Fleetnet project. NoW is founded by the German Ministry of Education
and Research (BMB+F) and it is composed by several companies: DaimlerChrysler, BMW,
Volkswagen, Siemens, NEC, Fokus, as well as the universities of Mannheim, München and
Karlsruhe. The scope of this project includes a) solving technical challenges related to robust-
ness, performance, scalability, security and safety for inter-vehicle communications (where our
seminar is focused), b) design a base architecture and platform for VANET technology and c)
explore applications for market introduction. This type of networks present a perfect subject
of study for a seminar considering its research challenges as well as its real life applicability.
Thus the seminar has attracted the interest of a large number of highly motivated students.
The 8 selected papers have given the participants a very good state of the art of the on-going
research in the following fields: Simulation and Modeling, Safety Applications Performance,
Positioning, Security and Data Dissemination.
The intended goal of the seminar has been to develop a technical basis in an innovative field,
to understand VANETs’ challenges and to recognize the variety of fields of activity related to
VANETs. Furthermore, special attention was addressed with every student to practice and
improve their problem statement, solution study, discussion and presentation skills.
We thank all participant students for their written contributions and strong commitment.
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Review of “Broadcast Reception Rates an Effects of Priority
Access in 802.11-Based Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks”
Daniel Schmidt
Abstract
The following report is based on the paper ”Broadcast reception Rates and Effects of
Priority Access in 802.11-Based Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks” by Marc Torrent-Moreno,
Daniel Jiang and Hannes Hartenstein [TMJH04]. It addresses the problem of probabil-
ity of reception of broadcast messages and how to improve it by adding priority access
mechanisms to the used protocol. Therefore, two different scenarios, a static and a dy-
namic one, were set-up to simulate the effects of the various protocol parameters and of
the improvements that have been made by reducing channel access time and improving
reception rates. To quantify the results, the simulations were done using two different
radio propagation models: the deterministic two-ray-ground model an the Nakagami dis-
tribution [Naka60]. The paper shows that a well designed protocol is needed to achieve
the improvements which are necessary to improve the reliability of VANETs.
1 Introduction
The most important aspect of vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) is without a doubt the
transmission of safety related data between the cars. Since the data has to be delivered to all
intended receivers, a broadcast message system is used to send these valuable data to all cars
within a certain communication range within fractions of seconds. The probably life-saving
importance requires the chances of receiving the broadcast message by other cars to be as
high as possible. In this paper, a priority access mechanism has been used as suggested by the
802.11e draft [802], utilizing a 5.9 Ghz spectrum with 10 MHz channels and offering a total
data rate of 6 Mbps. As a real world experiment would be too complex and costly at this stage
of development, the analysis of this priority mechanism is done using computer simulation.
First, the influence of some parameters is evaluated in a static scenario. The insights gained
from this simulation are then used in a dynamic model to observe their impact on a vehicular
network.
2 Radio propagation models
If we want to study the effects of a priority mechanism, we need to know the quality of
reception at different distances from the sender. To describe this propagation of radio waves,
various models have been developed. The simplest of them is a free space model without
any reflection, diffraction or scattering, which is highly unrealistic. To increase the degree of
realism, a second ”ray” that reflects off the ground on its way to the receiver is added in the
two-ray-ground model. Later, a far more sophisticated model developed by M. Nakagami is
used, which adds a fading parameter.
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2.1 Two-ray-ground model
The two-ray-ground (TRG) model is the simpler radio propagation model of the both used.
To study the propagation of radio waves the model assumes two rays between the sender and





Figure 1: Simple explanation of the two-ray-ground model
2.2 Nakagami distribution
In contrast to the very simple two-ray-ground model, the radio propagation model developed
by M. Nakagami is far more sophisticated and realistic, as it adds a fading parameter m to
represent the channel fluctuations.






x ≥ 0,Ω > 0,m ≥ 1/2
x: signal amplitude
m: fading parameter depending on d
Ω: average power depending on d
The most likely values for m and Ω for the work on the paper were determined by measuring
the packets received by moving cars on a highway following a vehicle, which sent 200 Byte
packets every 100 ms. The recorded data was then used to estimate the values with the help
of a maximum-likelihood estimation. Ω was estimated to a certain value of average power,
decreasing with d−2. The fading parameter m has been fixed to the values 3, 1.5 and 1 for
distances lower than 50, between 50 and 150, and higher than 150 meters, respectively.
3 ns-2
ns-2 [ns2] is widely used to simulate wired and wireless networks and their respective ISO/OSI
layers. The program has been developed by the University of California, Berkeley and is now
maintained by the Information Science Institute of the University of Southern California.
To create a simulation you can either choose one of the several protocol implementations
already included in the package or start programming your own. The simulation setup is
then written into a TCL script, where you can i.e. define your nodes, their parameters and
the traffic between them. The results are stored in so called trace files and can be analyzed
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with tools like TraceGraph1 which allow a graphical display of the information. There are
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Figure 2: Channel access in 802.11
To understand how priority access works we first take a look at the distributed coordination
function (DCF) channel access method used in ”classic” IEEE 802.11. If a node wants to
send a packet to the channel it senses the medium. If it’s busy, the node waits until the
medium becomes available again pauses until the DCF interframe space (DIFS) time is over
and the backoff timer (BT), a randomly assigned number limited by the contention window
(CW), is decremented to 0. If another node accesses the channel in the mean time, the
backoff procedure is suspendend and can only be resumed after the node currently accessing
the channel has finished its transmission and one more DIFS time has passed. If BT value
reaches 0 - if a collision occurs with another node, a new BT value is assigned and the whole
procedure starts all over.
In the example given in Figure 2, there are four stations. Station A has already accessed
the channel and transmits its data. Stations B, C and D have BT values of 6, 5 and 3,
respectively. When Station A has finished its transmission, the three other nodes pause for
the given DIFS time and then start decrementing their backoff timers. As station D is the
first to reach BT=0 it starts transmitting its data immediately when it reaches BT=0. During
that time, the other backoff processes are paused, until the medium becomes available again.
Then, after the DIFS time and two more SlotTimes, Station C reaches BT=0 and sends its
packets, causing Station B to pause its backoff procedure.
5 Implementation of priority access
To create a priority access method the Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA) has
been implemented as a ns-2 module as proposed in the IEEE 802.11e draft with respect to
broadcast messages. The implementation consists of four different access categories (AC)
which define the level of priority. The higher the access category the higher the priority
of the node actually is. Instead of using DIFS and a fixed contention window (CWmin),
as normal network nodes do, the prioritized nodes use interframe spaces (AIFSD[AC])and
different contention windows (CWmin[AC]) depending on their respective access category -
Table 1. The interframe space is determined by the following function:
AIFSD[AC] = SIFS + AIFS[AC] * SlotTime
1TraceGraph, http://www.geocities.com/tracegraph/
2NAM: Network Animator, http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/nam/
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Table 2: Scenario 1 priority parameters
The values of Short Interframe Space (SIFS) and SlotTime are given by the simulation setup
- 32 µs and 13 µs, respectively.
Prioritized nodes can now access the channel earlier than non-prioritized nodes, therefore
resulting in shorter channel access times.
6 Simulation scenarios
Both simulations were run on a 3.2Ghz Pentium 4 with 1 GB RAM. Each pass took up to
nine hours of computation time and resulted in five gigabytes of data. The analysis of this
data lasted for over three hours.
6.1 Basic scenario
The basic scenario uses a static topology without any moving nodes. As this setup has no
direct relevance to the addressed topic of vehicular networks it is used to study the different
values for AIFS and CW and their effect on channel access time and probability of reception.
The chosen values can be found in table 2.
6.1.1 Setup
The topology of the simulation setup looks like this: 600 cars are placed on an eight-lane
highway. Every lane is 4 meters wide and the distance between two cars in one lane is 20
meters. In order to simulate the radio propagation, the deterministic two-ray-ground model
is used. Each car sends 500 bytes sized UDP packet every 100 ms with 10% jitter. One car,
placed in the middle of the highway, is acting as a prioritized node, all other have access
category AC=0.
6.1.2 Results
Figure 3 shows that the AIFS value has a much bigger impact on probability of reception
than a tweaked contention window. A lower AIFS results in an almost doubled probability
whilst a smaller CW increases it only minimally.
























Figure 3: Probability of reception for some AIFS- and CW-values
AIFS/CW RcvPkts SentBT1 RcvBT1 SentBT0 RcvBT0
2/15 27.7% 69.3% 22.6% 5.8% 67.2%
2/7 31.1% 66.8% 22.1% 12.0% 66.6%
1/7 54.5% 46.4% 71.1% 11.9% 76.4%
1/3 59.4% 45.9% 71.0% 26.6% 78.9%
Table 3: AIFS and CW effect
To explain this behavior, we have to understand how this is happening. Let’s assume a
busy saturated medium and lots of nodes waiting for a free channel to transmit data, so
their backoff procedures are paused. If all the nodes are non-prioritized, some of them will
eventually collide when the channel becomes available, if the had the same BT value. However,
if one of the nodes is prioritized, it could access the channel one SlotTime earlier than all its
neighbors since it only had an AIFS=1 whereas the non-prioritized had AIFS=2.
Two cases can lead to this situation: First, during a busy period, the prioritized node creates
a packet an chooses a BT > 0. When possible, it decrements the backoff timer and pauses
with a BT=1. With the channel becoming available again, it can only collide with nodes
having generated a packet during the last busy period and a backoff timer value of 0, which is
very unlikely. Second, again assuming a busy channel, the prioritized node generates a packet
and gets a BT=0 setting. This node now cannot collide with a non-prioritized one because
the latter would have to wait at least one more SlotTime before decrementing its BT value.
To determine which of these two situation has more impact, the results of the simulation have
been further investigated - see Table 3.
• The number of successfully received packets is specified by the parameter RcvPakts
• When a packet is sent after the backoff timer has been paused with BT=1, SentBT1
ist increased by 1
• RcvBT1 indicates the number of successfully received SentBT1 packets
• SentBT0: This is the number of sent packets after new backoff timer has been initial-
ized with a starting value of BT=0
• As before, RcvBT0 states the number of received SentBT0 packets
The analysis shows that most of the packets have been sent after a paused BT=1 - see columns
SentBT1 and SentBT0. Column RcvBT1 shows very well the Influence of a low AIFSD value.
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With priority access, chances for a successful reception are three times higher than without.
If we take a look on the RcvBT0 values, the chances for a colliding SentBT0 packet are very
low, as mentioned before. One could expect there cannot occur any collision, but the hidden
terminal problem exists. In this case, the reception of data is compromised by a node close
enough to the receiver but outside the sender’s carrier sense range so it cannot be detected
by the sending node.
6.2 Dynamic scenario
So let’s have a look on the more realistic and more important scenario with added mobility.
In contrast to the static scenario, now, all the cars are moving on a circular highway.
6.2.1 Setup
Again, we have an eight-lane highway, but now, the road is circular and there are four lanes
in each direction, as can be seen in Figure 4. The circle has an inner radius of 350 meters
Figure 4: Scenario 2 setup
to avoid interferences caused by cars on the opposite side of it. The cars are distributed
uniformly along the circle and drive with a constant speed of 55 km/h to 120 km/h which
has been randomly assigned to all the cars of one lane. So every car in each lane travels at
the same velocity and no crashes can occur. Every car except one has access category AC=0.
The high- prioritized car is placed on the 6th lane counted from the middle of the circle. Four
sub-scenarios were created differing in intended communication range and packet size:
1. 100 m communication range, 200 Bytes packet size
2. 100 m communication range, 500 Bytes packet size
3. 200 m communication range, 200 Bytes packet size
4. 200 m communication range, 500 Bytes packet size
All these scenarios use the two-ray-ground model. So, the last one was re-run using the
Nakagami distribution.
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Scenario Channel load Priority CAT Non-Priority CAT
100m/200B 1.28 Mbps 0.4 ms 0.9 ms
100m/500B 3.2 Mbps 1.6 ms 4.8 ms
200m/200B 2.56 Mbps 1.2 ms 3.9 ms
200m/500B 6.4 Mbps 3.6 ms 16.4 ms
200m/500B (Nak) 6.4 Mbps 9.0 ms 26.5 ms
Table 4: Dynamic senario: channel access time (CAT)
6.2.2 Results
The most interesting metrics in this scenario are channel access time, a standard metric
defined by the time from packet creation to sending it to the channel an the already mentioned
probability of reception, the percentage of successfully received packets by the cars at a certain
distance from the sender, ± 2.5 m. The latter has been chosen because one of the main goals
of a VANET is, in a case of emergency, to inform as many other cars as possible, which are
intended to receive that data.
Table 4 contains the measured channel access times for both prioritized and non-prioritized
nodes in different environments. As we can see, the channel access time is much shorter for
priority nodes. Figures 5, 6 and 7 visualizes the probability of reception for the 100m/500B-
, 200m/200B and 200m/500B-scenarios using the non-deterministic two-ray-ground radio
propagation model. The figures show, that on a saturated channel, using a priory access
mechanism pays off more (about 150% improvement) than on a less loaded channel (only
about 10%). If you take a closer look at the figures, you will probably see the decrease of
probability of reception at about two thirds of the intended communication range. This is
one of the consequences of the hidden terminal problem, where nodes outside the sender’s




























Figure 5: Probability of reception for 100 m communication range and 500 Bytes packet size
As the previous results of this scenario were run using the two-ray-ground model, one more
pass with the Nakagami distribution model was done. As viewable in figure 8, probability of
reception drops as channel access lasts longer. This shows very well, how big the impacts of
using another model can be. But still, the reason for this collapse remains unknown. That’s
why another investigation was undertaken to study the sensed packets received per second
(Sens. Pkts/s) by a node and the ratio of the channel idle time (Ch. Idle Time).
• Sens. Pkts/s is the average number of received packets per second with power geater
or equal than the Carrier Sense Threshold, which is the defined power level the node
can sense.
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Figure 7: Probability of reception for 200 m communication range and 500 Bytes packet size
• Ch. Idle Time is defined by the time ratio, that the node senses the channel as idle.
This value is calculated for the whole simulation time.
Scenario (200m,500B)
Priority Non-Priority
TRG Nak TRG Nak
Ch. Acc. Time 3.6ms 9.0ms 16.4ms 25.5ms
Sens . Pkts/s 3325.2/s 3093.2/s 3324.6/s 3096.8/s
Ch. Idle Time 10.8% 4.4% 10.6% 4.4%
Table 5: Comparison of channel access time, Sens. Pkts/s and Ch. Idle Time
The results in Table 5 show that the node in the two-ray-ground scenario senses more packets,
but the node in the Nakagami scenario actually senses a busier channel. The explanation to
this could be a bad distribution of the packets over the time resulting in longer busy periods.
In the Nakagami scenario collisions mainly occur because of the existing hidden terminal
problem and not only for nodes having the same BT value. Taking this additional amount of
collisions into consideration, the performance loss in the Nakagami scenario is not such a big
surprise.
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Figure 8: Probability of reception for 200 m communication range and 500 Bytes packet size
using Nakagami distribution
7 Conclusion, future work
As we could see, the two very important metrics in vehicular ad hoc networks, probability
of reception and especially channel access time, can be improved by adding priority access
mechanisms to the protocol. The efforts only pay off when used in a saturated environment
with a high channel load - a situation that can be expected if VANETs become popular. On
the other hand, a good radio propagation model has to be chosen. The partly tremendous
differences between two-ray-ground and Nakagami model show, that the performance fluctu-
ation caused by a non-deterministic propagation model can be enormous. To further improve
the performance of VANETs, there a still some factors which haven’t been investigated in this
paper. First, the service quality could not only been enhanced by tuning the protocol, but
also by using further developed hardware technologies like better antennas, or enhancing the
communication range by better retransmission and multi-hop relay strategies. Another thing
not taken into consideration is the temporal and spational correlation of the power strengths.
In this paper, every node has a individual power level not being influenced by its neighbors.
The paper shows in a good and understandable way the importance of a priority mechanism.
This mechanism is implemented by tweaking only two parameters, the AIFS value and the
size of the contention window. But unfortunately, we can not be sure of the significance of
the improvements. As we have seen, the utilization of another model can have a tremendous
effect on the yielded results. After all, only a real world experiment could prove or disprove
the results of this work.
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Review of “Vehicle-to-Vehicle Safety Messaging in DSRC”
Philipp Woock
Abstract
This paper discusses the proposals of Xu, Mak, Ko and Sengupta on how to design a MAC
protocol for vehicular ad-hoc networks that is suited for transmitting safety messages in
the DSRC frequency band. Their protocols are based on packet repetition. They explore
the influences of transmission power, number of vehicles and resulting interferer number,
message range and data rate on the feasibility of transferring safety messages. To be able
to make propositions about the different protocol variants, they define their Quality of
Service measures: The probability of reception failure (PRF) and the channel busy time
(CBT). All protocols are evaluated and compared in terms of PRF and CBT to find out
which of them with which parameter settings are usable in vehicular ad-hoc networks.
Xu et al. show that their research is a promising starting point for further development.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As there is an ever increasing number of cars on the streets, car crashes and traffic jams
increase as well. To enhance overall security, cars somehow should warn each other about
dangers. To do this, the cars form a vehicular ad-hoc network. Then the driver (perhaps
assisted by an ESP-like device) can react to such a warning prior to seeing the danger with
his own eyes. How these messages between the cars are sent is topic of the paper.
1.2 Safety Messages in general
Safety Messages cover information regarding crashes, traffic jams, hard braking manoeuvres,
fishtailing cars, slippery ground and many other situations where other road users are in
danger and should be notified. Each vehicle will be sending them continuously. Vehicles
that recognise a hazard or become a hazard themselves create messages describing type and
position of the hazard and send them to all cars within reach.
Of course the real world situation is not that easy. Sending and receiving messages to and
from lots of cars need elaborate mechanisms. Otherwise messages get lost or just come too
late. Questions arise: Will there be too much messages when there are lots of cars? Will too
much safety messages hinder other uses of the system? How big should such a message be?
And there are even more questions. The possible solutions to those problems are presented
in the paper of Xu et al.
As stated above, a safety message should contain mainly type and GPS position information.
Therefore it can be kept relatively small sized. For we want the messages to be transmitted
quickly, it is helpful to have them as small as possible. Furthermore, smaller messages require
smaller bandwidth.
Furthermore these messages have only a short lifetime because they are only useful as long
as they are recent.
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1.3 Broadcast vs. unicast
The vehicular ad-hoc networks are different from networks one is usually familiar with. In
most internet situations, communication is unicast. That means that two agents communicate
with each other. In our vehicular network one vehicle should deliver the safety message not to
just one other vehicle but to all vehicles that can be reached because the safety messages are
important for all vehicles in the sending range. This means we need broadcast communication.
Assume we were using unicast communication: Each vehicle would need to establish a separate
connection to every other vehicle in reach. This alone squares the number of connections. In
addition there is the overhead of setting up these connections and closing them. In vehicular
ad-hoc networks there are many changes in the neighbourhood which would cause continuous
handshaking and termination of connections. This is extremely complicated and not suited
to get a first idea of how vehicular ad-hoc networks will look like.
Moreover they assume that no roadside radio stations for synchronisation purposes are in-
stalled, as this is very costly and would cause huge efforts to install them. A pure ad-hoc
network is the goal.
1.4 Some notions
Not every reader may be familiar with basic notions in this paper. I want to clear up those
notions first:
What mainly hinders the unfailing reception of safety messages in a wireless ad-hoc network
is interference and attenuation.
1.4.1 Interference / SINR
Interference arises when two senders A and B concurrently send a signal and a receiver within
the range of both of them tries to decode the signal. He receives different signal power from
A and B depending on where he exactly is. If the received signal power of A and B is roughly
equal, neither one of the signals can be decoded correctly. For successful decoding, one signal
must be stronger than the other by a certain margin. Just imagine how hard it is listening
to two persons talking to you simultaneously and equally loud.
A more formal definition:
”‘The interference range is the range within which transmission from an interferer makes
the signal-to-interference-and-noise-ratio (SINR) of the legitimate receiver smaller than a
certain threshold, so that the legitimate receiver cannot correctly receive the message from
the legitimate transmitter”’ [Wu03]. See also Appendix A of [XuMS04].
1.4.2 Attenuation
Attenuation describes that every radio signal is damped as the distance to the sender increases
and due to obstacles and the surrounding air. At a certain distance the attenuation is so
high that the signal has become indistinguishable from thermal noise. To estimate the real
attenuation there are several so-called path loss models. The paper uses the two following
models.
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1.4.3 Friis and two-ray model
To estimate the real transmission power the destination radio receives, one makes some sim-
plifications. These models are two very basic models that certainly don’t fully match the
situation on the roads. But to get an idea if the system will be feasible at all they are
sufficiently accurate.
The Friis Free-Space model is used for short distances, where source and destination radio
have a line of sight between them. To calculate it, it takes nothing more than wavelength,
antenna gains, transmission power and system loss into account. The received power decreases
with d2, d being the distance in-between.
The two-ray ground reflection model is used for longer distances where reflections from the
ground have to be considered additional to the line of sight. It is not well suited for short
distances. Depending on the length difference of the two paths and the wavelength, the signal
partially cancels out at the receiver or doubles in received power. The signal power at the
receiver decreases with d4. [Ye00]
1.4.4 Hidden terminals
Hidden terminals are nodes that are not aware that another node wants to receive data. It
is possible that they start their own data transmission and interfere not-knowingly with that
other communication. With a RTS/CTS protocol this problem is solved. Sometimes hidden
terminals are referred to as hidden nodes. (See Figure 1)
RTSCTS
Node T sends
Request To Send (RTS)
Node T can now safely send data to R, as HT is
aware of the communication going on and therefore
keeps silent.
Without RTS/CTS HT may think the channel is free
although T is sending, because HT is too far away
from T.
Node R sends Clear To Send (CTS)
Node T Node HT (




T R HT HTHT
Figure 1: Hidden terminal problem
1.4.5 DSRC - Dedicated Short Range Communications
The FCC granted 75 MHz at 5.9 GHz for uses that ”‘increase traveller safety, reduce fuel
consumption and pollution and continue to advance the nation’s economy”’. This DSRC
band has got seven channels. Six service channels and one control channel. All vehicles are
monitoring the control channel regularly. Messages have one of three priorities: ”‘safety of
life”’, ”‘safety”’ or ”‘non-safety”’. The paper assumes that safety messages take place only in
the control channel. (It doesn’t matter in which channel the messages are actually transported
as long as all vehicles monitor this channel.) [XuMS04]
DSRC is based on 802.11a technology, due to the used frequencies are very similar. 802.11
technology is well-known, widely available and comparably cheap. 802.11 radios can transmit
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messages safely over distances of 200 to 300 metres. The data rates that 802.11a provides are
6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48 and 54 Mbps.
The DSRC service channels are planned to be used for additional services as toll collection,
updating the navigation system, entertaining services and so on.
1.4.6 Simple collision model
The simple collision model is fundamental for the considerations by Xu et al. That means if
two messages overlap in time and are within interference range of each other, neither one can
be decoded correctly and both are lost.
2 Why something new?
There are lots of MAC protocols around. Is none of them suitable for vehicular ad-hoc
networks? A summarisation of different known MAC protocols and how applicable they are









Figure 2: Where the MAC layer is located in the ISO/OSI layer model
Xu et al. rule out the known protocols for different reasons:
2.1 TDMA, FDMA, CDMA, SDMA
The Time / Frequency / Code Division Multiple Access protocols are not useful, because
they need a central station that allocates time slots, frequency bands or codes. In our ad-hoc
network there is no central station. Communication should be self-organizing. Furthermore
we assume random access which the xDMA protocols do not do natively. They could emulate
it with a very quick reassignment of slots. But again, a centralized coordination station
would be needed. The authors don’t mention the SDMA protocol whereas there is interesting
research on how SDMA seems to be quite well-suited for vehicular ad-hoc networks. It is
inattentive to not mention it and why it is possibly not suited. SDMA for mobile ad-hoc
networks is discussed in [BaVa01].
2.2 MACA, MACAW, FAMA
Those not so well-known protocols are based on RTS/CTS and are therefore not suit-
able, because our communication is broadcast where sender and receiver do not know each
other. Further reading about MACA, MACAW and FAMA: [Nara02] and improvements on
them: [Wu04]
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2.3 Other protocols
HIPER-LAN/1, Black Burst and the Enhanced Distributed Coordination Function (EDCF)
of the 802.11e standard have some Quality of Service (QoS) features but they are not suit-
able anyway: HIPER-LAN/1 and Black Burst can’t combat hidden terminals. EDCF gets
into trouble when the number of contending packets (of the same priority) is high, which is
undoubtedly the case for safety messages in vehicular ad-hoc networks.
2.4 Cellular networks
Cellular networks can manage the communication between fast moving vehicles without that
much of a time delay, but they need base stations. Furthermore, cellular communication
doesn’t allow for two mobile nodes to directly communicate with each other. Each node
first has to communicate to the base station (two hop communication). Those cellular base
stations are much more expensive than simple 802.11 units that DSRC uses.
3 The scenario
3.1 Estimations about road traffic amount
How many cars take part in that ad-hoc communication? How fast do they travel? These
questions are important to estimate needed bandwidth, transmission power and Quality of
Service (QoS). Xu et al. assume roads with a maximum of 8 lanes and smallest vehicle distance
of 10 m (per lane) which is reasonable. The full parameter list is in Table 1.
Moreover they assume the maximum speed to be 90 mph (ca. 145 km/h) and a message
creation interval of 50 ms which leads to a movement of 2 metres between two messages.
Assume German motorways where two cars in opposite directions may have relative speeds
up to 500 km/h: Even then there are only about 7 metres between two messages. Xu et al.
consider message generation intervals up to 500 ms. This is too long when travelling at high
speeds. On that aforementioned German motorway the cars may send as little as two to four
safety messages to each other while they are within the message range. So in Germany it may
be necessary to tune the parameters according to the travelling speed. Ideally, the message
creation rate increases as travelling speed increases and vice versa.
Message generation interval (ms) 50, 100, 200
Packet Payload Size (Bytes) 100, 250, 400
Data Rate (Mbps) 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54
Average Vehicle Distance (m) 10 (jammed) 30 (smooth)
Message Range (m) 10-100 30-300
Lane Number 4,8
Table 1: Traffic parameter ranges
We saw that what we need is broadcast communication without roadside stations. There
is no need to relay safety messages from one to another vehicle due to the 200 m – 300 m
range of 802.11 is enough by far to react to dangers. That range achievable with single-hop
communication is sufficient for most vehicles to come to halt.
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3.2 The used QoS measures
Xu et al. introduce two measures to describe the QoS. The PRF (probability of reception
failure) and the CBT (channel busy time).
3.2.1 PRF - Probability of Reception Failure
The PRF describes how likely it is that a message can’t be received properly. It is written by
PRF (L, τ)
where L denotes the distance between sender and receiver and τ denotes the message lifetime.
The PRF is the probability that a randomly chosen message by a randomly chosen sender will
not be received by a randomly chosen receiver at distance L within time τ . (Definition from
[XuMS04])
To keep track of all the surrounding vehicles, each vehicle needs to have a real-time estimator
that reconstructs the traffic situation from the safety messages. The estimator should be able
to interpolate some missing (faulty transmitted) messages. Subsequent missing messages
however should wishfully not occur. So PRFs in the range from 11000 to
1
100 or lower should
be appropriate. These numbers are just a guess, since there are no real estimators yet. But
these PRF values ensure that an estimator shouldn’t get into trouble.
The further away the receiver is from the sender the higher is the possibility that interference
occurs. Hence the worst case to cover is PRF(Message Range , Message Life Time). When
the paper speaks of PRF values, these worst case values are meant.
3.2.2 CBT - Channel Busy Time





It can only be expressed as a fraction because there is no control channel protocol yet, and it
therefore cannot be ascertained how much remaining time would be sufficient for other uses.
Everything one can do at the moment is to keep the CBT as low as possible to allow for the
highest possible amount of other traffic as well.
4 MAC layer design considerations
The MAC layer has to decide when to send a messages and at which transmission power.
The goal is that messages can be received best possible.
As we use broadcast communication policy we have no receiver feedback. This doesn’t allow
us to get knowledge about the receivers and thus they cannot give us information with which
we could achieve higher reception reliability. We need to find other ways to increase it.
Xu et al. evaluate several variants of protocols that simply send repetitions of the message.
Some of the protocols they developed do additional Carrier Sensing (CSMA). Repetition takes
place in the lifetime of the safety message i.e. while the message is useful. (See Figure 3)
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Figure 4: The MAC extension layer
The network layer 2 consists of two sub-layers. The LLC (logical link control, IEEE 802.2)
and the MAC (medium access control) layer. Xu et al. add another extension layer between
them. (Figure 4)
When a message is to be sent, the extension layer changes to repetition generation state.
Here the Packet Event Queue (PEQ) is formed and time slots are assigned to the events
(repetitions). Then it transits back to idle state. When the time has come for such a repetition
to be sent (i. e. the timestamp belonging to the event in the PEQ is reached), the extension
layer switches to the dispatch state, sends the packet down to the MAC layer and returns to
idle state. (Figure 5)
On receiving a message from the MAC layer the message ID is inspected and the extension
layer turns to repetition removal state. If the ID is new, the message is new and hence handed
over to the LLC layer. If it is already known the message is simply discarded.
5 Protocol proposals
Xu et al. were not satisfied with any of the existing protocols (Section 2), so they designed
some new protocols. In fact these are quite simple protocols basing on ALOHA respectively
slotted ALOHA that try to guarantee a successful transmission by repeating the message.
The basic concept is to send the same message so often that at least one of these repetitions
will reach the destination. The lifetime of a message is divided into time slots with every
time slot allowing one repetition of the message to be sent with actual message size and
transmission rate.
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Figure 5: MAC extension layer state machine
5.1 AFR – Asynchronous Fixed Repetition
AFR is configured with k being the fixed number of repetitions. The protocol randomly
selects k time slots out of the maximum of n slots the lifetime of the message provides. So
each message is repeated k times. AFR is without carrier sensing.
5.2 APR – Asynchronous p-persistent Repetition
In APR each of the n time slots gets a message with probability p = kn . Thus the expectation
value of how many slots are filled is k (as in AFR) but not every message is repeated exactly
k times. APR like AFR does no carrier sensing.
5.3 SFR – Synchronous Fixed Repetition
SFR is nearly the same as AFR. The only difference is that in SFR the time slots in all nodes
are synchronised to a global clock. That means that repetitions overlap either completely
or not at all. This reduces the number of collisions and hence increases throughput. This
technique is known from slotted ALOHA.
5.4 SPR – Synchronous p-persistent Repetition
The same as APR but with synchronised slots as in SFR.
5.5 AFR-CS – Asynchronous Fixed Repetition with Carrier Sensing
AFR-CS is standard AFR improved with carrier sensing. How the modified MAC layer
accomplishes carrier sensing is shown in Figure 6. Whenever there is a packet handed over
from MAC EXT layer, the MAC switches to carrier sensing state. If the channel is busy, the
packet is dropped. If it is idle, the system turns to MAC TX (transfer) state and delivers the
packet to the PHY layer. On receiving a packet from the PHY layer, the packet is checked
for integrity and handed over to the MAC EXT layer if error-free. Carrier sensing helps that
packets from other senders are not destroyed through interference.





















Figure 6: MAC layer with carrier sensing
5.6 APR-CS – Asynchronous p-persistent Repetition with Carrier Sensing
The same as AFR-CS but with p-persistent slot allocation as in APR.
6 Analysis
6.1 Simplifications
Of course some simplifications are made:
The analysis is not done for all possible parameter combinations as this would be a huge
amount of work with possibly only little more worth. Xu et al. chose to do only simulations
for a certain representative parameter set and look further only where it seems to be promising.
They mainly use these nominal parameters: Messages are generated every 100 ms and there-
fore have a lifetime of 100 ms. They set the message range to be 80 m. A four-lane road is
assumed with 30 m distance between vehicles on each lane. The formula
Interferer number =
2 · Interference Range
Metres per vehicle
· Lane number
tells us that 75 interferers are involved. How to calculate the interference range can be found
in Appendix A of [XuMS04]. It depends on message range, sender-receiver distance and data
rate.
Another simplification is that only homogeneous traffic is studied. The transmission power,
repetition number k, data rate and packet size are the same for all nodes. This is a not a
heavy limitation because road traffic characteristics do not change that much between two
Safety Messages. In my opinion, some adaption is needed though. Assume the change from
travelling at motorway speeds to a traffic jam. The estimator must be aware of the new
situation and take care of it (e.g. adjust message range). This is not subject of the paper but
reminds that this is still uncovered.
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6.2 Mathematical assumptions and simulation tools
Xu et al. assume the message generation process being Poisson, because Poisson is ”‘an
approximation of the superposition of large number of independent periodic processes with
various interval and starting time”’. They determine very close upper and lower bounds for
the event that all repetitions of the message fail.
In addition to the mathematical analysis they perform simulations on a newly composed
DSRC simulator. First they use the SHIFT simulator to simulate the vehicles driving subject
to validated models on realistic roads. The trajectories of the vehicles (which are also the
trajectories of the radios) are passed on to the NS-2, an open source network simulator that
simulates the data transmissions using an 802.11a radio model and the proposed protocols.
The data from NS-2 is post-processed to obtain CBT, PRF and the probability of long bursts
of reception failures. Besides, they recoded the data structure of NS-2 to have linear execution
time. That made it possible to simulate up to thousand participating vehicles.
6.3 Findings
In qualitative terms, if you increase the number of repetitions, the chance that one of them
will be transmitted successfully should increase, too. Repeating very often however leads to
more collisions and higher channel usage and is therefore not helping but harming. So there
is an optimum number of repetitions. Of course this optimum depends on message generation
rate, message range, number of participating radios (traffic density), message size and so on.
It is clear that more repetitions may help to reduce PRF while increasing CBT at the same
time, and vice versa.
Raising the transmission power increases the probability that a message is received properly
because in the near field the SINR is increased, but on the other hand the interference
range is extended, too. If everyone was sending with maximum power, most of the messages
would be received as noise. Imagine humans that tell stories to each other simultaneously:
With everybody shouting as loud as he can, only few pieces can be understood correctly.
(You understand more the nearer you are to the speaker). With everybody only whispering
it’s the same. That means there exists an optimum transmission power depending on the
characteristics of the vehicular neighbourhood.
In their results the mathematically calculated PRF values are higher than the values from
the simulation across the board. They say this is because the Poisson based model allows
it that a message may collide with the previous message from the same node because their
lifetimes could overlap. In simulation, two messages cannot overlap at the same node, which
is just reasonable. It doesn’t make sense that one node sends two different safety messages
at a time, so there is no collision. Thus the PRF values from the simulation are smaller
than those from mathematical analysis. Except for this, the simulation curves show the same
behaviour as the mathematical calculation does. We see that simulation behaves nearly as
the mathematical model predicted. (Fig. 7a)
As one can expect, the synchronous protocols and those with carrier sensing perform better
than the pure asynchronous ones. The protocols with p-persistent repetition do worse than
those with fixed repetition number (Fig. 7b). Xu et al. presume that the p-persistent protocols
gain less in repeating more often than what they lose in doing less repetitions. They don’t
investigate further and there is no need to do so. Simulation showed that there is just no
advantage in transmitting in that p-persistent manner. As for the synchronised protocols,
they reached the lowest PRF but need a global synchronisation mechanism that is not there.
As stated earlier we want to avoid any additional roadside devices.
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Concerning the CBT, the AFR-CS protocol is much more ”‘channel friendly”’ as it shows
significantly lower CBT than both AFR and SFR which perform nearly identical.
The analysis of the PRF values of the different protocols shows that synchronous protocols
and those with CSMA are notedly better than AFR or APR (Fig. 7b). In their model, the
more the repetition rate increases the more it became apparent that the CSMA protocols
have an advantage, even over the synchronous ones. Obviously, AFR-CS is the protocol of
choice and that’s why Xu et al. focus on AFR-CS in the following steps.
a) b)
Figure 7: a) Comparison of simulation and mathematical PRF results b) PRFs for discussed
protocols in nominal setting
In their model it makes little to no difference how a number of interferers is distributed on
the road. The single number tells about which PRF can be achieved at which CBT. If there
are 150 interferers and a message range of 80 m it nearly doesn’t matter if they are at 30 m
distance on 4 lanes or if they are at 15 m distance on 8 lanes (Fig. 8).
Figure 8: Independence of interferer distribution
The influence of data rate on PRF and CBT is as follows: If the data rate is high, the
message needs less time to be transmitted and therefore lowering collision probability. But
to achieve high data rates you also need high transmission power. That in turn leads to a
higher interferer number. Considering the possible 802.11 data rates, the lowest PRF values
are at 18 Mbps for the AFR-CS protocol with 24 Mbps being very close. This optimum is
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different between the protocols. Most have it at 18 Mbps, the synchronous ones at 12 Mbps
and pure 802.11 has it at 24 Mbps.
It is shown that the probability of message failure bursts is negligible low, in fact one order
of magnitude lower than PRF values for single messages.
6.4 Feasibility
The feasibility depends on the desired values of PRF and CBT. Completely occupying the
channel is not an option and PRFs don’t get arbitrarily low. Xu et al. evaluate only AFR-
CS as it performed best. They tune the parameters for optimum repetition number with
optimal transmission data rate and minimized power while still covering the message range.
They consider PRF below 1100 and CBT lower than 50%. They evaluate message sizes of 100,
250 and 400 bytes. For example they regard message size 250 bytes with message generation
interval 200 ms feasible up to 110 interferers (Fig. 9). This for example equals a four lane
road with inter-vehicle distance of 20 m and a message range of 80 m. As PRF and CBT
depend nearly only on interferer number, this situation is the same as an eight lane road,
inter-vehicle distance 30 m and 60 m message range.
These traffic situations are common, but in more extreme traffic situations with 150 interferers
it is impossible to achieve a PRF of 1100 with keeping CBT below 60% (Fig. 8). If this is feasible
in the end cannot be told at the moment because is not known yet how other traffic on the
control channel will look like. Should 25% of the channel be enough for all other duties one
can have more interferers while having low PRF. If it turns out, that safety messages can
have only a maximum of, say, 35% of the channel, then the AFR-CS protocol will not work
in situations with higher interferer number than about 113 as you see in (Fig. 8).
Figure 9: Feasibility region division lines for AFR-CS with PRF < 1100 and CBT <
1
2 .
Feasible and infeasible labels have to be read separately for each line.
Xu et al. say that message generation intervals of 200 ms are feasible combined with message
sizes of 250 bytes and interferer number greater of 140 if the network and application designers
work together. They claim that message generation intervals faster than 200 ms are not
needed as this is still faster than a human driver can react and that GPS updates position
information only at 5Hz. They aver that with 140 interferes one is able to cover a message
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range of about 150 m which should allow most vehicles to come to halt. In my opinion the
message generation interval should not get longer than 200 ms because the value of the safety
information decreases quickly when it arrives late. This is difficult with the proposed protocols
as either message sizes must be small or PRF/CBT values are not as desired.
6.5 Discussion and open issues
This paper is well thought out and Xu et al. use elaborate methods to describe and simulate
their goals. Of course, as there is only very little information on how other services in the
control channel will look like, it is somehow a shot in the dark. The researchers were forced
to use the CBT which is a relatively simple measure. It is a similar situation with PRF
values. As there is no estimator yet they have to make assumptions what an estimator
might be capable of in the future. They wish PRFs to be lower than one failed message out
of hundred. Perhaps a fully developed estimator can handle one failed message in twenty
which would allow PRFs up to 120 . Then feasibility studied basing on PRF of
1
100 is not
beneficial. Look at the CBT measure: Perhaps one of these six service channels in DSRC will
be relabelled as a security channel that carries only safety messages and will be mandatory
for all vehicles to be monitored (in addition to the control channel). Then the CBT would
be meaningless as there was no other traffic to consider in that channel. All those things
depend heavily on future development. But for the time being the assumptions in [XuMS04]
are reasonable and provide a solid basis for further work.
What the authors describe in their work is how one can just add a MAC EXT layer to an
existing MAC layer and get a mechanism that works well in many situations and is quite
simple to build. From the viewpoint of reusing existing techniques this is just fine. But the
underlying assumptions the authors use are too theoretical. Many real world difficulties are
not considered at all or not enough. So I think it is not a fully realistic view how traffic looks
like.
Safety messages need to be received with high reliability, otherwise they are no use. With
the assumptions of the paper, I think that the results have to be taken with a grain of salt.
They do show how far the development is and where there are still problems but the absolute
numbers are moot. What works in their simulation is probably different to what works in
reality.
They mention a truck between two cars that will just dampen the signal power very strongly.
This is not covered by using free-space or two-ray model. Moreover, both models assume the
broadcast area as perfect circles, which is unrealistic. Reflections and obstacles are not taken
into account either. The shadowing model could have been used for better results [Ye00].
As cities install more and more 802.11a access points, the electromagnetic pollution will cause
additional interference and thus complicate reliable reception of the safety messages, because
the frequency bands are adjacent. For example: In 802.11b you have 13 channels but only 3
of them don’t overlap. If there are more sources of interference, there are bigger problems to
receive signals properly.
Another situation comes to my mind which has to be taken into consideration but isn’t
covered by the paper:
Vehicles on bridges that lead over another road cause additional interference which is not
covered by the model. And they may get safety messages from below that don’t have anything
to do with their traffic situation. Here a digital map would be needed that helps filtering out
safety messages that obviously come from another road.
The problem is that these situations are really important. In many cases there will be
scenarios not matching with the simulation. The designers of the physical layer will do their
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best but they won’t be able to provide a completely faultless data stream to the MAC layer.
I think that one should investigate into other, more sophisticated MAC protocols.
Another open issue is an adaptive method to control the message range. The vehicle has to
notice that road characteristics have changed. But how good that works, heavily depends on
the estimator that models the surrounding traffic situation.
What’s more is that safety traffic differentiates itself into two priority classes which has not
been modelled yet.
The paper gives a good insight of where the problems are, but fails to deliver something that
is of instantaneous practical use.
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Review of ”Centimeter Vehicle Positioning and Lane Keeping”
Nils L. Roßmann
Abstract
Improving safety and driver assistance is today an important topic. More and more
cars are equipped with navigation systems, but safety systems helping the driver to stay
on the road/lane are still not available. This report describes how positioning systems
can assist vision based systems in lane detection. Additionally positioning systems are
very important for vehicular ad-hoc networks. In these context we are not interested
in the relative position of the vehicle with regard to the lane boundaries, instead it is
importand to calculate the absolute position and especially the information on which
road and more precisely on which lane the car drives. The comparison with the visual
system shows that positioning systems with access to very precise maps could fullfill the
VANET requirements. As a consequence of higher precision in positioning systems there
is also a higher map precision required. To refine the today available maps, a statistical
approach is used which reaches a precision about 10cm.
1 Introduction
In vehicular ad-hoc networks it will be possible to inform the driver about the road-state in
the near distance. To do this, every car collects information (e.g. speed, weather condition,
lane surface, etc.) which could be requested by other cars or send out in dangerous situations.
These messages could be received by many cars several kilometers away. After receiving a
warning message from another car, the system has to decide if the information may concern
the driver or not. To do this, especially the absolute position of the sender car and the own
position is important. For example, when an accident happened in front of us, then it is
important to know if it is on the same road, same lane or somewhere else. Crashes due to bad
view are also a mayor problem. When there is a slower car on the same lane, not recognized
by the driver, a car equipped with communication devices and a precise positioning system
could warn the driver in time. So the positioning system precision is very important.
Beside this, lane keeping and departure warning would be an important safety improvement.
Especially on bad wheather conditions and/or bad view. With such a system it is also possible
to issue lane departure warnings if the driver falls asleep. For such application the relative
position with regard to the lane borders is needed, which could be calculated by vision based
systems.
Vision based Lane recognition is a good studied topic and there are many proven solutions
for lane departure warning. There also exists systems which allow autonomous driving with a
speed up to 160km/h. But there are still unsolved problems like a bad view due to rain/snow
etc. or missing lane markings. So another system is needed to assist the vision based system.
The idea is, using a very precise positioning system and a precise map to calculate the distance
to the lane borders and compare the results with the vision based system. The authors
implement a positioning system based on GPS, inertial measurement units and precise maps
and a vision based system. This system ha s been tested on the A8 near Stuttgart.
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The whole system will be described in the following sections. We start with the positioning
system because for vehicular ad-hoc networks the absolute position is needed. If the posi-
tioning system is good enough to assist the vision based system, than it is also good enough
to determine the current road and lane of a car. After describing the positioning system, a
short introduction to the vision based system is given and then re results will be analyzed in
concern of the vehicular ad-hoc network requirements.
2 Positioning System
Talking about nationwide or global positioning naturally GPS comes up. Due to it’s global
availability it’s the most used system. Due to its low precision, there are several improvements
needed to get the required precision, though the used approaches are described in the following
sections. Another problem with GPS is, that there are outage gaps (e.g. in tunnels or in
cities with high buildings around). To bridge these gaps, inertial measurement units could
be used. They allow a high accuracy for a short time period, so they are sufficient to bridge
short gaps. After calculating the absolute position of the car, it is necessary to determine
the current location with regard to the map, which is done by a map matching algorithm.
For navigation systems, it is sufficient to determine the current road, but to determine the
current lane, a lane level precise map is needed. The whole system is described in the following
sections.
2.1 GPS-Basics
The GPS system operates with 24-28 spacecrafts in an orbit about 20.000km around the
earth. It’s design guaranties that there are at least 4 and up to 12 spacecrafts in range.
Every spacecraft sends a signal which includes the send-time (ti) and all information to
calculate the spacecrafts position (xi, yi, zi. With 4 spacecrafts it is possible to calculate the
users position and the exact time without precise clock in the GPS-receiver.
So we have to solve four equations with the four unknown variables x,y,z,t:
√
(x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 + (z1 − z)2 = c(t1 − t) = d1
√
(x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2 + (z2 − z)2 = c(t2 − t) = d2
√
(x3 − x)2 + (y3 − y)2 + (z3 − z)2 = c(t3 − t) = d3
√
(x4 − x)2 + (y4 − y)2 + (z4 − z)2 = c(t4 − t) = d4
di : distance to spacecraft i xi, yi, zi : spacecraft i coordinates and time x, y, z, t : user coordi-
nates and time c : speed of light
On the left side, the three-dimensional distance is expressed by the difference between the
known spacecraft-position and the unknown user-position. This is equal to the distance
calculated by multiplying the propagation delay with the light speed. By resolving these
equations we get the users position and the exact time. If the GPS-Receiver have access to
a precise clock, then three satellites where sufficient to calculate the position. This approach
is called trilateration (see figure 1).
GPS offers two services: Precise Positioning Service (PPS) and Standard Positioning Service
(SPS). PPS is encrypted and can only used by the US-/NATO-military. Therefore each
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Figure 1: trilateration, source: [Roth02]
spacecrafts sends on two frequencies, the base signal on L1 (1575.42MHz) and a correction
signal on L2 (1227.60MHz). By comparing the phase difference between the L1 and L2 signals,
the error caused by the ionosphere can be calculated and minimized. At the moment, only the
L1 frequency is usable for civil use. The military accuracy is unknown and the civil accuracy
is about 10m.
2.2 EU Galileo
Galileo (see [DoHä04]) will be a satellite system similar to GPS developed by the European
Union. The goal is to create a positioning system compatible with GPS but independent from
the US-military interrests. It is planned to send unencrypted on 4 frequencies with encrypted
(commercial) add-ons to reduce errors. With two-frequency receivers a horizontal accuracy
about 4m and a vertical accuracy about 8m should be reached. The time accuracy should be
about 10ns relative to UTC.
2.3 GPS as assistance for vision based Lane Recognition
Is it possible to reach the same accuracy like a vision based system? A standard mobile
GPS receiver for civil usage only reaches an accuracy about 10m. This is good enough for
navigation systems, but not acceptable for lane departure warnings, not even for safety related
warnings in ad-hoc networks. In addition to normal GPS there exist solutions to improve the
accuracy. These will be described in the following sections.
2.3.1 Kalman-Filter
When more then four spacecrafts are available it is possible to improve the accuracy with
statistic methods. One of the most importand method’s is the Kalman-Filter developed by
Rudolf E. Kalman 1960. The Kalman-Filter is a statistical filter who estimates the states of a
physical system (e.g. position, velocity) from noisy observations over time and minimizes the
mean-square estimation error. The next State Xt+1 is a linear function of the current state Xt
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plus some gaussian noise. In addition to most other filters (e.g. low-pass-filters) the Kalman-
Filter is a purely time-domain filter. There is no transformation in the frequency-domain and
back needed.
The standard Kalman-Filter is designed for linear models. For non-linear models the
extended-Kalman-Filter must be used. The extended-Kalman-Filter essentially linearizes
the non-linear function around the current estimate.
2.3.2 DGPS
Most errors occur due to influences in the ionosphere and troposphere. To eliminate these
errors we can use a second receiver on a fixed base-station with known coordinates. The
base station should be located as near as possible to the mobile GPS user, so that the same
deviation occur. The base-station also calculates it’s position based on the GPS-Data. Then
it calculates the difference between the known exact position and the GPS-position. This
difference is sent to the mobile user so that he can include the difference in his calculation
and improve the accuracy. With DGPS a accuracy about 5cm in real-time is still possible
and with post-processing down to mm-range. In Germany, DGPS correction data is available
nationwide from SAPOS ([SAP]).
Figure 2: DGPS
2.4 Inertial Measurement Units (IMU)
To bridge short GPS-outage gaps and to improve the accuracy, inertial measurement units
are used. A IMU consists of gyroscopes and accelerometers for all three axis (x,y,z) as
shown in figure 3. A Gyroscope detects angular movement. Accelerometers detect changes
in velocity. Going out from a known position, it is possible to calculate the current position
even if we can’t receive correct GPS data. Especially in cities with high buildings this is
very important, because then it is often possible that less than 4 satellites could be received.
To obtain a high precision an accuracy less or equal than 1deg/hr for the gyroscope and
1m or less for the accelerometers are needed. Currently used IMU’s for navigation systems
only offer an accuracy about 1 deg/sec for the gyroscope and 200mg for the accelerometers.
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Further requirements are a small coverage type (0,5”x0,5”) so that it could be placed near
the GPS-antenna and it should be cheap. These requirements could be nearly met by MEMS
IMU’s (see [Cone00]) which are built using microscopic electromechanical structures. So, cost
and volume availability can be reached in 2008.
Figure 3: IMU for tree axis
2.5 Maps/Map Matching
To calculate the distance to the lane borders it is necessary to match the calculated position
with a map. For safety applications like lane departure warning an accuracy about 10cm is
also necessary. Current maps provide only 5m for metropolitan and 50m for less populated
areas. With such a low accuracy map matching is very difficult and error-prone, especially
when there are more possible roads nearby. With precise maps and precise positioning systems
map matching will be easier. A technology to make precise maps exists today, but it is very
expensive for nationwide-deployment. An alternative could be to use statistic methods and
standard positioning systems with standard accuracy (about 1,5m) in private and commercial
vehicles. These vehicles collect data during theire normal drives. Based on the data from
multiple drivers the lane network refines dynamically. This method is cost effective, efficient
and scalable. A precision about 10cm has been demonstrated (see [WSMO+03]).
2.6 System Integrity
An important requirement is system integrity. We have to determine wether the system has
met the expected performance. To do this, there are several crosschecks necessary. So first
the DGPS-data is crosschecked with the INS (Inertial Navigation System) data. Then the
integrated GPS/INS data is crosschecked with a dynamic model of the vehicle.
To simplify this model, they assume that there are no sideslips at the rear tires. In curves,
the corresponding noise level will be increased. As parameters mass, speed and angular rate,
are used to describe the vehicle. With such a model, it is possible to define a Kalman-Filter
where the integrated INS/GPS output serves as observations. As output the Kalman-Filter
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estimates the error of the INS/GPS data which is used for integrity checks. The integrity
monitor is shown in figure 4 and a test-run with the corresponding integrity level is shown in
figure 5.
Figure 4: Integrity Monitor
Figure 5: Positioning offset (TestA)
In figure 5 there is an jump in the There are about 30 cm position jumps at the time of 93
s due to system calibration. However the jump is captured by the integrity indicator. There
are a couple of other integrity warnings which can be considered as false alarm because of
the tight threshold setting.”
3 Introduction to Visual based Lane Recognition
The goal of a VBLR-system is to determine the relative position of the vehicle with respect
to the lane. This is done by detecting the lane features like lane markings and boundaries.
To improve the image processing an extended Kalman-Filter estimates the lane borders and
allows creating a search window. To define the Kalman-Filter a road model is required.
3.1 Clothoid road model
To define such a model, we take into account that most highways are built under the constraint
of slowly changing curvatures with clothoids. Clothoids are used to ‘connect‘ straights with
circular arcs. Without clothoids, there would be a curvatures jump between the straight and
the circular arc which cannot compensated by the driver (see figure 6).
The clothoid road model can be approximated by a third order polynomial. P(X,Y) stand
for a lane border point (X and Y axis are shown in figure 6).
X = ±W
2






Xoff : lateral offset of the vehicle origin with respect to the lane centerline, Θ: vehicle’s yaw
angle relative to the lane axis (small), C0: curvature, C1: curvature rate
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Figure 6: Clothoid road model
Figure 7: Road parameters
Based on the clothoid model and the Kalman-Filter search lines are placed in the image. The
lines are centered on the prediction of the Kalman-Filter. The line length is based on the
variance calculated by the Kalman-Filter. Then a dark-light-dark (DLD) transition is used
to detect the white or yellow lane mark on the gray lane surface (example image: 8).
Figure 8: Search lines, source [rnJSMö04]
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4 Wrap-Up
4.1 System Overview
The complete system consists of the VBLR and the positioning system (see figure 9). The
VBLR uses the camera-data as input and detect the lane boundaries with help of the road
model. With this information it calculates the relative position of the vehicle.
The positioning system uses DGPS- and INS-data as input. With this data and the help of
the vehicle model it calculates the absolute position. With the absolute position and precise
maps it is possible to do the map matching and find the current position with regard to the
map and so the relative position with respect to the lane can be calculated. This system
has been implemented and tested on the A8 near Stuttgart. These tests showed that the





























Figure 9: System Overview
4.2 Conclusion
The tests showed that centimeter vehicle positioning can used to assist vision systems for
lane-keeping applications and could help to achieve robustness and smoothness. Before such
a system is usable, precise maps must be created. An ultimate deployment can be expected
within the next decade.
4.3 Discussion
The paper gives an good overview over the current available positioning technique. Never-
theless it’s hard to understand if you are not familiar with the topic especially with statistic
filters. Also the road model could be explained a bit more detailed. Beside this, it’s an good
starting point to this topic.
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The positioning system is good enough to determine the current lane which allow applications
like crash warnings in ad-hoc networks. A precision of about 15cm would be sufficient for
the demands in ad-hoc networks. But there where no tests on smaller roads and not enough
information to evaluate the overall accuracy. If we assume that vision based systems are very
precise, then an offset of 15cm is still good enough. So the main unsolved problem is the bad
map quality, which must be improved before such a system could be used. Although it is
impressing how precise the statistical maps are, I think they cannot be expected in the next
few years for a whole country like germany. Due to security concerns it is very important,
that the data for the maps is trustful. Beside this, it also must ensured that the tracked data
is stored anonymous due to data privacy. And also when such maps are available and created
with trustful data it must be assured that the received GPS- and DPGS-data can be trusted.
Perhaps it is possible to include a signature in the GPS data-stream.
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A way to exchange data between cars is building a network, especially a mobile ad hoc
network. This may lead to problems, which are different to those of a cellular network.
To meet required performance, a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) has to rely heavily
on node-to-node communication. This, however, makes it easy for attackers to broadcast
malicious traffic in order to creep into it. Hence the approaches try to ensure the com-
munication based on the fact that malicious nodes may be present. Thus, the nodes have
to verify incoming information. For this, a model based on physical and statistical prop-
erties is given, with whose the nodes can search for possible explanations of the received
data. They accept the most likely ones. The method is based on several assumptions,
such as nodes are able to distinguish nodes from other nodes and a parsimony argument
which will be described later. Furthermore, there are several ways to trouble the network.
Attackers can spoof the other participants by pretending the existence of others nodes
(spoof nodes), which will confirm the malicious information to be correct. On the other
hand, attackers can intercept messages and forward information with new content. To
conclude, several examples are given for a better comprehension of the system.
Keywords
Data validation, location verification, privacy, model of the Vanet, attackers
1 Introduction
1.1 Problems of ad hoc networks unlike in cellular networks
An ad hoc network is a number of wireless mobile nodes, which may build a temporary
network without infrastructure and without central administration. If the nodes have to
be mobile, e.g. in cars, this will be called a vehicular ad hoc network. In addition, there
may be physical node collusions and insider attacks which would not exist in non mobile
ad hoc networks.[Chen04]. In cellular networks, beside the assured transfer of the data a
further approach is the security of applications like e-commerce, route planning etc. The
validation of these data will be reached by key management solutions and authentication of
network ”insiders”. In the VANET, however, this would be the wrong approach, because
there are much easier attacks to the system than modifying data, such as producing wrong
announcements about traffic jams, dangers etc. or intercepting messages and forwarding
new, or selected information. Especially the VANET has to provide security against strong,
colluding adversaries which may well be trusted members of the network.
1.2 Conditions for the model
The verification of data exchanges in a VANET is supported by sensor driven technologies.
Sensors offer the possibility to detect the direction from where the message arrives, and so
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the source may be found. Furthermore, every participating node has to validate the data it
receives (of course, the node always trusts the observations which it made itself). The test
is based on physical, safety conscious and statistical conditions (e.g. two nodes can never
occupy the same place at the same time, information from nodes which travel faster than at
a predefined velocity will be ignored, ...). These conditions lead to a model of the VANET,
which can be constructed offline and so, to a large extent, when manufacturing the vehicles.
Every participating node has to maintain this model and all incoming information will be
compared with it.
1.3 The parsimony argument
If the incoming information is not consistent with the model, the node uses a principle which
is called parsimony argument. This means that the probability that many honest nodes are
present besides a few malicious ones is more likely than the other way around. So the node
will always believe in a small number of attackers and thinks the explanation with the fewest
malicious nodes to be the best.
1.4 The Sybil attack
An attacker may reproduce itself several times and spoof a node with the assumption of having
got many messages from several different nodes. So the malicious node can bolster its view
of VANET and outwit the model. To arrange this situation, a malicious node can send its
messages multiple times. To counteract the Sybil attack, it is important for the participating
nodes to differentiate nodes from each other. Here, the sensor capability comes into play
which can differentiate the directions the data came from. The sensors combinated with the
parsimony argument and the model of the VANET make the defense against the Sybil attack
effective, because inconsistencies may occur and the malicious node can be detected.[MuMa04]
1.5 Network density
In every network, distributed algorithms work better if the density increases. This sup-
ports especially the connectivity of ad hoc networks because of some special properties like
asymmetric connections. The communication pathways in ad hoc networks are not naturally
bidirectional. The higher the density is the more likely it is that other pathways are used.
Thus, it is reasonable to establish redundancy between the nodes. The mobility combined
with a high density makes it difficult for the colluding malicious nodes to maintain a config-
uration where several attackers try to spoof a number of honest nodes as shown in the figure
1.
2 Solutions from other scientists
There exist other approaches to defend attacks like the Sybil attack, but in general they are
not strong enough to manage all possible situations which may appear in a configuration like
VANET. [Phil04]
2.1 Redundancy check
The redundancy check tests if information came several times from the same source. This
works if every node can be definitely identified. But the Sybil attack for example can send
messages with distinct identities, so the redundancy check will fail.
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Figure 1: VANET A: The black circles represent the malicious nodes, which surround some
honest nodes. In this configuration, an succesful attack would be likely because the majority
of the attacker. They can interact and so convince the honest nodes of false information.
VANET B: It is very expensive to maintain the configuration in A, the vehicles drove further
and the number of colluding malicious nodes in rate to the honest nodes decreased. Hence,
the probability of a succesful attack is reduced
2.2 Resource testing
The resource test reviews which resources such as storage, computational or communication
ability a node has. If the collectivity of a certain resource of various senders has the capacity
of one node, the test proves that an attack may have appeared. This check fails if the attacker
can increase his own resources, which is not quite difficult to arrange.
2.2.1 Radio resource testing
The radio resource test is based on the assumption that every node broadcasts its information
over a certain frequency. If a message comes several times with the same frequency, the
source must be the same, the information will be accepted only once. If the attacker has the
possibility to send over more than one frequency, this check is not sufficient.
2.3 Registration
A quite good approach would be to register every participant of the VANET. If every node
may be identified definitely (by his license plate or other criteria), a malicious node will have
no chance to attack a VANET in a simple way. On one hand this would solve the complexity
of some problems with attacks, on the other hand the complexity to manage the registration
all the time and to update it with every new participant and delete the leaving ones would
exceed the benefit by far and make such an ad hoc network absolutely impracticable.
2.4 Position verification
Position verification allows the network to verify the position of each node. The data that
come from the same location are assumed to belong to one and the same participant. But
the nodes are static and do not develop this approach.
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3 Kinds of adversaries in a Vanet
In this chapter the different types of attacks will be described, as well as the possibility for
the attackers to exploit the description of the methods VANET uses, in order to prepare for
their attacks. An attacker in VANET is successful, if he accomplishes to convince other nodes
of his malicious data. In other approaches, already spoofed nodes as well as Sybil nodes may
be used to control the malicious information. In this approach the validation is not based on
the accumulation of agreed data, but the model is based on probabilities of attack scenarios,
which may appear in a VANET. As a result of that it is more reasonable to distinguish attacks
based on their type, their possible targets, the dimension the attack can get and the possible
outcomes. They will be described in the following articles.
3.1 Different types of attacks
There are many ways to influence the consistency of the VANET data. A malicious node
could tell other nodes about traffic jams or dangers which do not exist or does not say the
truth about its real position. The detection of such nodes depends among other things on
the capacity of the sensors, the evaluation of the exact direction of another node, however, by
measuring the distance is difficult. Furthermore the exchange of new messages, which are used
to validate new data depends to the actual density of the network and other environmental
influences. The mobility inherently constitutes a problem of the accurate measurement. So
it may appear that an attacker keeps undetected for some time. This case has to be caught
by the model.
3.2 Possible targets of attacks
An attacker could be very strong and collude with other malicious nodes over high quality
out-of-band channel for example. The attacks which are locally arranged are more likely,
because the probability to interfere with other proximate honest nodes is lower. But it
is more difficult to maintain the configuration of a situation because of the mobility of the
nodes. So the malicious node may have several distant targets but the data of the neighboring
nodes could make the attack ineffective.
3.3 Dimension of an attack
The scope of an attack depends on the number of nodes which are influenced by the malicious
data around a malicious node. If there are not many nodes in this area, the dimension of
the attack cannot be very large, but if false information circulate beyond that local area it is
called an extended attack. The approach of VANET can avert a local attack which can lead
to an extended.
3.4 Possible outcome of an attack
If an attack has happened, three results are possible. An attack may be undetected if a node
was isolated or completely surrounded by malicious nodes. In this case, the attacked node will
accept the malicious information. An attack may be detected by various nodes, but leaves
an uncertainty about the received data. The third possibility is the detection of the attack,
consequently no node can be influenced by malicious data. If there are honest nodes between
the malicious ones surrounding an honest node, it may have a chance by validating the data
with the parsimony argument. If enough honest nodes are present, the attack will fail.
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3.5 Developing a Model of adversaries
On the basis of a model a node can make an efficient evaluation of arriving messages, being
aware of the possibility of an attack. Due to this a model of adversaries is given with the
challenge to calculate the most likely attack. Considering a statistical basis or combinatorial
instruments, an ordering relation will be developed, where the explanation with the fewest
malicious nodes is on the top and which will be actualized all the time. The fundamental
question is, whether the attacker can use the knowledge about the model of adversaries, for
his own advantage: can he change his way of attack to trick the model or can he send other
messages which are more likely in the model? To avoid such a situation, the model has to be
strong enough to make the adaptation for the attacker to the new situation more expensive
than a normal attack. In addition, the model not only has to actualize the probabilities but
also to remark and to react to changes in the pattern of attack of the adversaries. Hence,
an adversary has to be observed for some time to include the usual ”arms race”. But in
spite of all the complexity of treatment of adversaries and their evaluation the possibility of
a mundane attack should not be forgotten.
4 Distinguishability
A very important condition in order to notify an attack is to be able to distinguish between
nodes. A Sybil attack is not possible if the node can differentiate the malicious node and the
spoof nodes. There are several assumptions which should be made. Every node observes its
environment, and if a message comes in, the node has to combine the observations with the
message. So it can check if the incoming message really came from the source. Furthermore,
the node has to be able to differentiate his direct neighbors. As a result of the assumptions,
there were two different cases to examine. On one hand the ability to localy distinguish what
is around a node, and on the other hand the extended variant.
4.1 Local distinguishability
As mentioned above, the node must realize which other node sent the data. This problem can
be solved by different solutions. For example transmission of light can be used (infrared or in
the visible light spectrum) if the vehicles are equipped with cameras, which realize the exact
direction where the signals came from. So the node can define the source of the message,
which is a very important condition. It allows to distinguish the next neighbors, otherwise the
node is vulnerable against attacks like the Sybil attack, or the consistency of his information
may not be given any longer, if a confusion occurs for example. Other physical signals may
be used to calculate the distance to the object, like ultrasonic rays or radar. But this could
lead to problems, because the nodes may increase or decrease the strength of their signal.
4.2 Extended distinguishability
The node not only has to know what is in his direct neigborhood, it also has to know what
happen beyond its neighbors. So the nodes exchange information between each other. Every
node observes its environment and sends these data to the other. Normally, data exchange
over larger distances may be limited by bandwidth and latency. But in this approach optimal
conditions are assumed.
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Figure 2: Node A recognizes his direct neighbors B1 and B2, but he is not able to reach C. A
builds up the communication to B1 and B2 and B itself measures the position of C. Because
of the data exchange between A, B and C all nodes know the position of each other.
4.2.1 Network density
As usual in ad hoc networks the pathways between nodes are redundant. If every possibility
to connect between nodes is used, the graph of communication is complete. Also malicious
nodes may be present, but their misconduct, perhaps not to forward data, should be corrected
by routing protocols. The methods which are developed for VANET work naturally better
if the connectivity of the graph is quite good, the parsimony argument will be used more
effectively.
4.2.2 Mutual identification
Every node should have a pair of private and public keys, which can be refreshed as often
as needed. Now, if two nodes had a close enough contact, they can exchange their pair of
keys and for the time of validity of the keys they can exchange data in a trusted way. The
privacy is pretty good in this approach, because the pairs of keys are quite short-lived. The
node decides when to change the key and where to send it again. Also the problem has to
be solved, how to refresh the keys several times (which is necessary for privacy) if two nodes
exchanged data for a longer period of time. An advantage is the possibility of authentication
not only over the time but also over a certain distance, because the source can be identified
by the key, even if he was not in the direct environment of the node (for the time of the
validity of the key) regardless from where the information came. Furthermore, if a node
sends information, which will be identified later as malicious, all its data will be classified as
questionable. In the model strong adversaries are allowed, which can exchange key pairs after
an authentication to attack a node. But if a larger group works with the same key and tries
to send the information as every node came from the same point, there is the possibility that
one of the group is identified as malicious, and then nobody can send further information.
That means, collaborating attacks may be counterproductive.
4.3 Privacy
An important problem in VANET is privacy. In the approach of Philippe Golle, Dan Greene
and Jessica Staddon [Phil04], it is realized by decentralisation, i.e. data which need a good
privacy do not have to flow to a centralized device which could be spied out. The information
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can be sent directly, thus an attack on some nodes would not lead to a crash of the system
and the information of all nodes are not saved at only one certain device.
To track a particular node the attacker should have many nodes around the target, thus they
can detect the position precisely. This would be very expensive to maintain, because every
node is mobile and it may move everytime. Because the mobility it is reasonable to care
about the extended distinguishability. A key pair is used to authenticate the communication
partners, it is refreshed continuously. This assures that an attacker cannot identify the node
as long as he wants to. A longer identification of the nodes is not needed. The nodes have to
exchange the pair of keys really carefully to maintain the privacy. There are several ways to
do that: The pair of keys may be changed at synchronized times, the nodes can include gaps
into the messages before changing the keys and they can exchange keys just in the moment,
the distance is close enough.
5 Developing the model
After having pointed out the aspects in and around VANET the following model is proposed.
Distance: The distance between two nodes P1 and P2 is defined as the Euclidian space
‖ P1 − P2 ‖
Event: E(D, f) is defined as an event where D is the data and f is a continuous function
f : T → P which is the locator function that specifies the location of the event over the
lifetime T ∈ R. The lifetime of an event can be a real short time, maybe just a point of time
or it is a longer time period (T = t or T = [t0, t1]). The data in an event may be, for example,
the identity or speed of the node at the location given by f(T ).
Node: (N, f, p) where N identifies the node uniquely whereby N ∈ N , f the function defined
at event and p is the radius in which the node makes his observations, p ∈ R
Assertion: Every node can observe its environment inside the given radius. If something
happens like the detection of another node, it broadcasts a message to the other nodes,
the content of the message is called assertion. If Node Oi observes an event, it produces a
message < (D, f) >Oi . Every node, which get messages has to validate the assertion before
accepting it. The lifetime of an event has to be a part of the lifetime of the node which
produce the assertion and for every single point of time of the event, it has to happen inside
the radius of the node. In a technical way, it means that (ni, fi, pi) is a node and the event is
E = (D, f). Ti is the lifetime of the node Ni and T is the lifetime of the event E. If T ⊆ Ti
and ∀t ∈ T, ‖ f(t) − fi(t) ‖ ≤ pi then the node can accept the assertion < (D, f) >Ni .
So nodes may exchange assertions with one another, in the practice in contrast to the theory
the exchange of data is limited by bandwidth and latency considerations. In this approach
these factores are ignored. So every assertion made by a node is available for every node - in
the strict sense in the local area, because an assertion is most important for the neighborhood.
5.1 Model of the VANET
The model of the VANET is developed to define the events or sets of events which are
possible. This could be based on rules or on statistical properties of events.
The model of the VANET is a function which maps the set of all existing events to the values
valid or invalid. Formally let ε be the set of all existing events M : ε → {valid, invalid}. If
there are several events {E1, ..., En} and there is a subset of ε, they will be consistent with
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the model if M(E1, ..., En) = valid and inconsistent otherwise. If the return value is just
binary, the assertion of a set of events is not really accurate, so the model will be extended
with probabilities, so the return value will be a value between 0 and 1.
So every node can validate its own observations and share them with others. The problem in
this approach arises from malicious nodes, which also can record events, that did not happen.
They are a risk for the consistency of the global database of events.
5.2 Meaning of a set of events
Every set of events can be identified by a number H ∈ N , and every set is partitioned into two
subsets, the hypotheses of validity H+ and the invalid or malicious ones H−. Every event in a
set of assertions K = {< E1 >O1, ..., < En >On} has an explanation ExpN (K) = {< E1 >h1O1
, ..., < En >
hn
On
} whereby hi ∈ H so that the subset of assertions tagged with hypotheses of
validity is consistent with the model of the VANET.
ExpH
+
N (K) = {< Ei >hiOi∈ ExpN (K)|hi ∈ H+}
And because H+ is the valid subset of hypotheses, the map of (ExpH
+
N (K)) of M is valid:
M(ExpH
+
N (K)) = valid
Naturally, every explanation is defined with respect to a particular node N , because every
node makes his own hypotheses of events (for example every node declares his own assertions
as true).
The explanations which a node gets will be ordered by the node, depending on the statistical
method used. It specifies a total ordering based on some scoring of the explanations. There
are several methods, for example scoring explanations based on their simplicity.
If a collection of data K is invalid under a model of VANET M and an additional ordering
collection of explanations of K is given, then there are two possibilities to proceed. On one
hand the data is declared as invalid because there was an error. On the other hand the errors
may be corrected when the best explanations use the assertions which are labelled with H+.
If there are several best explanations, the assertion labelled with H+ can be split and a subset
of K can be corrected.
6 Examples
The methods of the VANET should be constituted by some examples. For a better compre-
hension, two cases will be described, the one where sensors work quite well and the other case
if the data transmission is complicated by weaker sensor capabilities. The second example
illustrates the importance of distinguishability.
6.1 First example
In this example it is assumed, that nodes may specify the exact location of all neighbors.
Furthermore the the location of a node which is sensed can be associated with its public key,
because location sensing is bound with communication.
In the database K are tuples: K = {< N1, x1 >O1, < N2, x2 >O2, < N3, x3 >O3...} Every of
these assertions Ai =< Ni, xi >oi means, that the node Oi suggest having an observed node
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at the position xi. If the observed node is beyond the observing range of the node, it has the
value unobserved. then may be deleted from the database. For every node some entries are
already made, because they can make assertions about themselves. Hence, there is a function
L who maps Ni to the position xi if the assertion is reflexive: < Ni, xi >Ni → L(Ni) = xi.
Furthermore it is predefined that K has reflexive entries for every node and every non reflexive
assertion < Ni, xi >Oi is consistent to the reflexive assertion of Ni. That means that the
position of the observed node is specified if the Euclidian distance of the position of the node
xi and the position of another node L(Oi) is smaller than the radius of Ni, and unobserved
otherwise. Formally it means: xi = L(Ni) if ‖ xi − L(Oi) ‖ ≤ p
Potentially there are malicious nodes present too, so the explanation has to label the assertions
with designations, truthful, malicious or spoof. Any criteria has to be satisfied by the labelled
tuples < Ni, xi >hiOi whereby hi ∈ t,m, s (true, malicious, spoof), so naturally the observations
which the node made has to be labelled as true (if Oi = N then hi = t).Furthermore, the
observers labelled as spoof do not appear in other tuples.
In some cases, it could be helpful to add some other tuples, who get the label added (a ∈ H+).
Every reflexive tuple that has been labelled m can be replaced by this new added, which supply
a correct location that is consistent with any other truthful observations.
To complete the model of adversary, the method has to count the labels ”malicious” which
a node got for one or several tuples from different observers. The explanation with the
fewest malicious labels seems to be the simplest one. If there are enough observations in the
database, the malicious node will be detected by the data in Exp∗N (K), depending on the
correctness of the positions of all nodes.
The advantage of this model of adversaries is, that the malicious node has not much possibil-
ities to attack, if one attack fails, or rather one assertion is labelled as malicious, all the other
assertions will be labelled as malicious too, so there is no second chance and the probability
to detect an attacker early is higher. Furthermore, the spoof labels in the explanations are
ignored so the higher ranked explanations have more spoof and fewer malicious assertions.
If there are only a few malicious nodes, there will be a simple algorithm to find the best
explanation. Beginning with node N a breadth first search is starting, traversing the arcs
from the observers Oi to the node Ni as long as Ni is not labelled as malicious. All reached
nodes will be labelled as truthful, all other nodes as malicious. The algorithm can terminate
if it found explanations of the same size which pass the consistency test.
In the following example some basic rules are important as usual: The probability to detect
the attack is depending on the density of the network. If some nodes do not have good
information about the nodes in the neighborhood, the detection of the malicious node will
fail or will be complicated. In this case, the malicious node generates additional spoof nodes
to enforce his attack. The spoof nodes record their observations into the database, but the real
nodes on their part do not make records of the spoof nodes. That will lead to inconsistencies
and will uncover the attack. The methods for detection could find the two explanations
shown in figure 4. The malicious node tries to support an illusory node by creating spoof
nodes. In this case the explanations with fewer malicious nodes seems to be more likely,
because one malicious node beside several honest nodes may occur more often than in the
other way around. The parsimony argument supports the right decision by assuming the
smallest number of malicious nodes.
6.2 Second example
In the previous example, the sensors of the nodes provided good measurements, even beyond
the direct neighbors. This time the possibility is considered that the sensors can just recognize
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Figure 3: The malicious node M produces new spoof nodes to support a false location M’.
The arrows constitute the observations which were made by the nodes, the dashed arrows
show missing observations.
Figure 4: Two possible explanations for the conflicting observations, many others are possible
too.
nodes in the environment without the certain direction. To compensate this matter of fact
is to add the region R into the database (Ni, Ri)Oi whereby the observer Oi assumes, that
Ni is positioned midst of the circle Ri. The exact size of the circle depends on the sensor
technology. This approach leads to the detection of malicious nodes even if their data are not
recorded into the database. Hence, it is possible that malicious nodes are totally unrecognized
and not to find in the data, as well as new data can be added by the test methods, letter
labelled with ”a” (added). A record could be < Ni, Si >aNi . Si is a region where Ni is possibly
positioned, the dimension depends again on the sensors. Also in this example, the explanation
with the fewest malicious nodes is prefered. A further attribute is established, ”i” for illusion.
In this method a malicious node can produce virtual nodes, which appear for the time of the
presence of the malicious node as real.
< Ni, R >
i
Oi→ ∃k :< Nk, Sk >aNk ∧(Sk ⊆ Ri)
This record averts that an unreal node appears in the database as a real node.
Now, there is a systematical tryal to find good explanations by assuming malicious nodes by
degrees and record them with the attribute added into the database. At the node N , the
breadth first search is started and marks every assertion as illusion if the observer is midst the
surrounding of a malicious node Nk and if its area is a subset of Ri(L(N) = Sk whereby Sk
subset of Ri). If the assertion is reachable, it is labelled with truthful, otherwise as malicious.
After this, the explanation with the fewest malicious nodes is used to correct the data.
The parsimony argument is not really reasonable to use in this case, a node in the surround-
ing of a malicious node could be influenced totally, its own world may be a complete illusion
produced by the malicious node. Hence, the approach is modified. As previous, the expla-
nation with the fewest malicious nodes is chosen with respect to the most honest nodes. An
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Figure 5: A possible configuration in a plane based on fixed range tests, every node is assumed
to be midst a circle
explanation with only one malicious but also just one honest node may be on the top of the
ordering. But by this modification there is not every problem solved. The attack would be
really expensive, because every honest node had to have a malicious node in direct neighbor-
hood, which simulates an illusory world. Especially in a mobile network, it would be very
complex if not just impossible.
A further approach is based on probabilities where above-average much or least nodes in an
area are more unlikely and this influences the ordering. Generally, to find the right explanation
is not simple at all. It depends on the topology, the surrounding, the accurateness of the sensor
data and the actual position of the nodes, because a unusual spreading of the nodes in the
area is not impossible. There is always the potential for a malicious node to change the
position a little and thereby to stay undetected.
7 Conclusion
The approach of Philippe Golle, Dan Greene and Jessica Staddon [Phil04] covers all sources
of error, which may appear to trouble the VANET. Every node itself collects data from its
environment and sends it to other nodes. By the use of the sensor technology the source of
the data can be detected. Every node can evaluate incoming messages. For this a model
is given which is based on physical and stochastic properties. If inconsistent data appear,
the most likely explanation will be found on the basis of a parsimony algorithm. The most
important assumption, however, for this is the satisfactory density of the network because
the methods just work effective if enough nodes take part and exchange information.
7.1 Conclusion in own words
The approach of the three scientists is based on some theoretical assumptions, which are not
practicable in the reality. The bandwidth as well as the latency are only in the model as-
sumed as optimal. In the reality even the efficient, fast and exact wireless data transmission
is not categorical possible. Those depend on the properties of the environment as well as the
technology used which also may be restricted under a financial aspect (the technology has
to be affordable for the rank and file). This leads to a main problem, the scale, because the
system will not provide reasonable values if the density is not high enough and the attrac-
tiveness of the system is restricted strongly. Furthermore, if an attacker has the possibility to
apply transmitter blocking signals, an area may be paralyzed, depending on the transmission
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technology used. These signals can interfere the broadcast and the message do not arrive its
receiver, it can be fragmentary or faulty.
The theory is sophisticated and the model covers possible scenarios in a VANET, but the
application in practice is just visible in real trials. VANET is based on frequent exchange of
information, the higher the density of information is, the higher is the probability to detect
attackers. If only few nodes are participating the succes may stay away. Hence, there have
to be many nodes directly in the beginning of the initiation. The frictionless start of a wide
system can be very difficult, problems may occur by installing it and especially in the first
time. This was visible for example at TollCollect. The entering was postponed lasting for
month and new problems occur often in the media.
7.2 Ideas of one’s own
To support the model of the VANET, certain vehicles could be declared as generally trust-
worthy, for example cars which are on the road all the time. These nodes, prepared with a
special key, always kept under surveillance and controlled may forward the validation of cer-
tain messages, reduce processor load as uncertainty and in a fair quantity release the system
as well as make it more safe. A vehicle, surrounded by several attackers, would be certainly
spoofed, even if there are few honest nodes around. The existence of base nodes, always en
route, collecting data by observations and by the way loaded with information could restore
the attacked node to consistency, because the information which come from it were generally
trustworthy. This one could broadcast information about the attacker detected with the data
of a base node and so increase the exclusion of malicious nodes. Instead of using vehicles for
the base, already installed systems like TollCollect may be upgraded or additional used. A
base node could send all its information to such a base station (distributed devices installed
once in a while on the road, e.g. at the points where the sensors of TollCollect are placed)
and every node who comes the way could get new trustworthy data.
7.3 Own opinion of the paper
The technical report of the three scientists is really exhausting to read and to apprehend.
The structure of the paper is from my point of view a little bit confusing, they explain for
the comprehension important things secondary (e.g. how does the Sybil attack really work,
which possibilities exist to arrange such an attack) and other sections like the examples are
so complicated that the real convenience is not directly clear. Some points are just mentioned
marginally (e.g. position verification) so that the real understanding just arise if additional
papers are read. Without having previous knowlede the paper is very hard to read and it
may be better structured to support the understanding. What is missing in the paper are
substantial concrete examples, there is mainly the theory described.
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Review of “The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles”
Torben Brumm
Abstract
Vehicular ad-hoc networks seem to be evolving quite fast and become a part of driving aid
in the future. But privacy and security of these networks are only rarely examined by a
few papers. “The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles” by Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srjdan
Čapkun, and Jun Luo [HuvL04], which deals with electronic license plates (a kind of
identification in these networks based on changing pseudonyms) and location verification
(where a car is situated at a specific moment) is one of them and will be summarized and
commented in this report. After that, I will present my proposal for a protocol for these
electronic license plates which handles authentication and changing pseudonyms and uses
cars and base stations established by a central authority (which also needs to be involved
in the protocol).
1 Introduction
Car technology has developed significantly during the last years and will develop even further
in the next several years. Some developments increase our safety (e.g. airbags), some our
comfort (e.g. navigation systems), and some of them are for controlling purposes (e.g. license
plates (which are not a real “technology” nowadays but they will be one as soon as they
become electronic)).
Especially communication devices (e.g. GPS receivers) become more and more important for
our behavior during driving. They are (or will be) also used by the officials for collecting
tolls or enforcing the law. It is just a matter of time when all our cars are equipped with one
or more communication devices which will identify them towards each other (and towards
stations near the road) or exchange even more complicated messages like traffic reports. The
possibilities are nearly unlimited. Communication technology can improve the safety in our
streets, ease the work of the police, and make driving less stressful than it is nowadays. We
will look into a brighter future...or won’t we? More communication means enforcing the
risk of communicating wrong data or obtaining information out of the given communicated
messages. While the technology is improving constantly, the matters of security and privacy
have been examined by very few people. But we need do ask ourselves: “Do these new
technologies also raise new problems concerning security and privacy or are they even more
secure than the old methods?”
One paper which discusses the aspects of security and privacy is “The Security and Privacy
of Smart Vehicles” by Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srjdan Čapkun, and Jun Luo [HuvL04]. I will
summarize the results of their work in section 3 after explaining some basic expressions used
in this report in section 2. In section 4 I will take a closer look at their results and give
my opinion on them. After that, I will give you a more concrete solution of their electronic
license plates in section 5. Section 6 concludes this report.
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2 Security Basics
In this section, I would like to describe some expressions I use in this report.
Tamper-resistant hardware basically is hardware put into a safe so that no one can manipulate
the hardware itself. It doesn’t have to be a real safe but a physical protection against misuse.
Any attempt to destroy the protection and getting access to the hardware (e.g. to get a key
out of it) should result in destroying the data and/or alarming someone (the owner or the
authorities for example).
A one-way hash function is a function that uses one value to calculate another one out of it
(very fast as it is a hash function). But it is impossible to determine the original value out
of the resulting value.
A challenge is a value (e.g. a set of bits) generated by a participant in a network. It sends
this challenge (maybe after manipulating it somehow, e.g. by using a hash function) to
someone else in its network and waits for a very specific answer. Different challenges require
different answers, so the communication partner has to calculate the answer after receiving
the challenge.
A symmetric key is a key two communication partners share in a network. They both use
this key for both encrypting and decrypting the messages they send to each other.
3 Paper summarization
The paper [HuvL04] gives a short overview about problems concerning security and privacy
of smart vehicles. The authors do not invent anything new, they just summarize ideas and
take a closer look at them concentrating on the aspects of security and privacy.
They often use the term smart vehicle. A smart vehicle is equipped with an event data
recorder (EDR), a GPS receiver, some sensors, a communication device, and a computing
device.
The EDR is similar to to a plane’s black box which records everything concerning the vehicle
to reconstruct a possible crash. The GPS receiver is installed to know the vehicle’s position
all the time while the sensors detect obstacles nearby the car during driving or parking. For
communication with other cars or stations along the road we need a communication device
which is capable of building safe mobile ad hoc networks. The computing device is responsible
for supervising all necessary operations like protocol execution during communication.
With this smart vehicles driving would become safer (e.g. by the sensors warning the driver)
and more comfortable (e.g. smart vehicles would be able to get an own personal route which
avoids traffic jams using the communication device and its positioning system).
The two main topics discussed in the paper are electronic license plates and location verifica-
tion (and the corresponding privacy and security problems). The following two sections will
give you a overview about their results concerning these two topics.
3.1 Electronic license plates
Smart vehicles would need an identification while they are using their communication device.
In the paper, this identification is called electronic license plate because it identifies itself
towards other cars or roads just like normal license plates do towards passing cars or people.
They could ease collecting tolls as it would be possible to check who entered when which toll
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road. Another objective would be to identify drivers who have fled an accident by “asking”
nearby parked cars what they have recorded (and who has passed them).
But there are some security and privacy issues these electronic license plates raise. In order to
use this identification for authentication, the authorities would have to give each car several
keys and certificates to ensure a secure communication between them. The structure of this
system has to be very carefully designed as it requires a similar privacy level as mobile phones
for example, but it also needs to be capable of exchanging messages in real-time because the
car’s location needs to be exact (for avoiding accidents for example) and the communication
has to be fast before cars get out of range (e.g. when there are very few cars on the road).
A concrete solution of this will be presented in section 5. The authors don’t think that this
electronic license plates will be a privacy problem as long as they are designed careful enough
(other systems like mobile phones or the internet are very popular despite the fact that they
are as private as the system of electronic license plates).
To become more specific: One problem is anonymity which is solved by assigning pseudonyms
to the cars (which have to change over time to protect the driver’s privacy). We can calculate
anonymity which is done in the paper using an anonymity metric based on entropy. Their
computed degree of anonymity d is
d =
−∑Ni=1 pi log2 pi
log2 N
where N is the anonymity set’s size and pi is the probability of the pseudonym being the ith
value of the anonymity set. The degree of anonymity represents the amount of information
the system presents (unwantedly) for a given pseudonym.
Another problem is a physical attack on the electronic license plate (disabling for example).
But this is even a minor problem compared to the license plates we use nowadays and which
we can “disable” (steal) very easily, because we are able to protect it better on the inside of
the vehicle or even trigger an alarm or alter law enforcement when there is a try to disable
it.
It’s quite similar with stealing and using the identity of someone else. Today it is quite easy,
electronic license plates can be made much more resistant to such attacks by storing them
in tamper-resistant hardware and certifying them. With modern authentication protocols it
will be much harder to identify yourself with someone else’s identity than it is nowadays with
stolen license plates. Stolen license plates look normal, but stolen identities can’t be used as
long as they are not able to fool the authentication protocols as well.
The last mentioned problem in the paper (which can’t be solved up to now) is a denial of
service attack which would jam the communicated signals.
3.2 Location verification
The second part of their paper concerns location verification and the security issues accom-
panying it. Two general solutions for location verification are explained:
The first one uses GPS (as mentioned above) which is quite spread even today and then sends
this data to base stations or other cars. But there are some drawbacks like the availability
in urban areas which block the signal (tunnels for example) or the tamper-resistant hardware
which is not very safe until today. But the main problem with GPS is that they are vulnerable
to several attacks (jamming, spoofing, etc.) which can also be enforced by relatively unso-
phisticated attackers. The most dangerous attack of those is using a GPS satellite simulator
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which can produce stronger fake signals than the real ones. Simple attacks could be stopped
by software changes, the clever ones can’t.
The second solution uses verifiable multilateration. For this solution, base stations spread
all over the country are needed, but we could get rid of the tamper-resistant hardware in the
car and install cheaper normal hardware. The solution works as follows: Four base stations
perform a communication with the car to obtain the distance between itself and the car. With
these four values it is possible to calculate the actual position of the car which is located inside
the triangular pyramid formed by the base stations. For a correct position in two dimensions
only three base stations are needed (Figure 1 shows an example).
Figure 1: Base stations v1, v2, v3, and v4 determine the left car’s location in three dimensions.
The right car’s location is determined in two dimension by v1, v3, and v5. (Taken from
[HuvL04])
The communication protocol performed between the base station and the car proposed in the
paper (based on distance-bounding protocols by Stefan Brands and David Chaum [BrCh93])
works as follows (after establishing a connection and mutual authentication): The car gener-
ates two random values Nc and N ′c which it hashes with a one-way hash function h. It sends
the result to the base station which answers by sending a randomly generated value Nv, the
challenge. The car responds to this challenge with Nc⊕Nv and after that sends the signed N ′c
to the base station. The base station measures the time between sending the challenge and
receiving the answer and calculates the distance to the car out of this value (also considering
the calculation time of Nc ⊕ Nv which is relatively short). To control the correctness of the
messages, the base station verifies the signature of the last received message and hashes Nc
and N ′c (which it knows by now) with the same hash-function h as the car. If the result
matches the first received message (the result of the hash function calculated by the car),
everything was correct. Table 1 presents a short version.
Following this protocol it is impossible for a car to convince a base station that it is closer to
the base station than it really is (as light travels at finite speed). It is only possible to hold
the answer for the challenge to make the base station believe that the car is further away
than it really is. But as there are several base stations involved in a location verification and
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Source Destination Message
C generates Nc and N ′c and calculates h(Nc, N ′c)
C V h(Nc, N ′c)
C generates Nv
V C Nv
C V Nc ⊕ Nv
V measures time between sending Nv and receiving Nc ⊕ Nv
C V Nc (signed)
V verifies signature, calculates h(Nc, N ′c), and compares it to received h(Nc, N ′c)
Table 1: Distance-bounding protocol between a car C and a verifying base station V
getting further away from one means getting closer to another one, it is impossible to tell the
system a different location than the real one, it is only possible to offer an unprecise location
with wrong values which of course will be noticed.
4 Paper evaluation
After summarizing the paper, let me add some comments to their results and the ideas they
mention.
The idea of smart vehicles is really interesting and would be a real benefit for the driver, but
who could afford such a car in the near future? Today, these technologies are only available
in some cars (some technologies are further spread than others, but even a GPS receiver is
still something special for a car). So, as mentioned in the paper, very probably there will be
very few of this kind of cars with all its technologies at the beginning which will result in
quite a small benefit for the owners as most of the features of the car rely on communication.
And if there is nobody to communicate with, we can’t use it. So in my opinion it would be
much cleverer to reduce the required components to a minimum to make the ideas work. But
as I can’t really tell which component to take out without limiting the possibilities we have
when using smart vehicles, I have to agree to their proposal which is to establish the services
first which are able to be used when only few cars are equipped. When these services are
used by enough cars, we can create services which need more cars and so on until every car
is equipped with the technology of smart vehicles.
4.1 Electronic license plates
In my opinion electronic license plates are (if designed carefully enough) not a bigger security
problem than today’s license plates. As mentioned in the paper, physical attacks are much
easier to control and using someone else’s identity would also become a more complicated
problem. But there is one critical problem which they only mention in one sentence: a denial
of service attack could kill the whole use of the system. As it is possible to jam every signal,
we are able to jam all the signals at our desires. For example: A driver causes an accident and
flees the scene (as mentioned in section 3.1). But as he flees, he uses another communication
device (not built into the car) to jam all his identification signals. No other car will be
able to store his identity and the whole concept has no use which means it is important to
establish communication protocols which are quite difficult to jam (impossible is impossible).
This way only few people can take advantage of this security problem. But for sure it will
continue to exist and should be further examined (before establishing an electronic license
plates network).
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What about privacy concerns? In my opinion, these electronic license plates are preserving
privacy as much as the license plates we use today. If we take a look at today’s license
plates, we will normally find information about the country the car is from, some additional
information where the car is from (for example the city in Germany) and a combination
of some letters and numbers. So it is possible to determine the origin of the car with one
look. To figure out the owner of the car we would need a database which translates the
alphanumerical combination into a person’s data (which is only accessible by the authorities).
Electronic license plates will also offer a code which you have to translate into personal data
(and only the authorities have access to it). Depending on the design and complexity of this
code, it can be easier or harder to retrieve information out of it. It also could be possible to
eliminate direct information about the car’s origin (like the city) to raise the privacy level.
Monitoring locations would also be quite the same. Whether we install a video camera to
record all passing license plates or whether we install a communication device which records
all electronic license plates of passing cars, the privacy is neither higher nor lower, only the
time we need to evaluate the data differs. But there is one privacy drawback we will experience
with electronic license plates: Depending on the protocol it could be needed to communicate
someone’s electronic license plate over a huge distance within a short period of time. All the
cars on the way from the car which wants to identify itself to the point where it needs to be
identified could listen to it and track the car’s location. Periodically changing pseudonyms (in
a carefully designed protocol) can help preventing this problem but if the tracker figures out
how the mechanism works which changes the pseudonym, he could track a car with minor
effort (The protocol in section 5 uses more or less random new pseudonyms). Today it is
much more difficult to track a car’s location.
4.2 Location verification
I have to agree that GPS receivers are quite insecure and easy to fool. As GPS signals
are very weak (10−16 Watts at the Earth’s surface [WaJo03]), they are very easy to over-
ride with stronger GPS satellite simulators. As these simulators are quite cheap ($10,000-
$50,000 [WaJo03]), we need to install more intelligent GPS receivers in our cars to be able to
decide whether it is a real signal or a (much too strong) fake signal. Without these changes
I don’t see a possibility to use GPS for more purposes than it is used today without taking
a high security risk. Even today it is dangerous to rely on GPS in certain ways.
Verifiable multilateration seems to be the better solution as it does not accept any false data
(only inaccurate positions are possible). But is this solution really easy to realize? We would
need base stations all over the country to be able to determine a vehicle’s location at every
time. The network would have to be without any holes or a car could disappear in a region
where there are no base stations. Even the established mobile phone networks can’t guarantee
a 100% availability, how could a new network suffice this requirement? To use this solution
efficiently, we would have to build all base stations at once (and connect them somehow)
which would cost much more than any company or country would like to spend on a project
that can only determine the location of our cars. Only if we reused a network which is already
there or if we used the new network for more than just location determination, there would
be a (financial) possibility to establish this kind of network. The GPS solution would also
need some base stations to communicate their location to, but it only needs one reachable
(and reachable can also mean “routed through other cars”) base station in opposition to three
or four directly reachable base stations during one location verification.
One thing we should not forget in both solutions is that only authorities should be able to
build (and run) these base stations. As soon as it is possible to run your own private base
station, you could act just like a real one and intercept the position data (GPS solution) or
find out about the distance between you and the car (verifiable multilateration). As it will
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be impossible to keep the hardware only available to the authorities, one should think about
this problem when designing the protocol which establishes the connection between car and
base station.
4.3 General comments
I think the authors had some good ideas concerning privacy and security for smart vehicles.
I would like to emphasize their point that privacy and security aspects did not stop the
internet or mobile phones. In both networks it is technically possible to determine at least
your identification (and sometimes your location), but the networks are very widespread all
over the world. And we can’t deny that it will be possible to determine identification and
location for any car if we establish the solutions mentioned in the paper. However, as long
as it remains difficult enough, there is a possibility that this solutions are really going to be
used someday.
The structure of the paper is very good, and it is very easy to understand. Their points are
convincing, I never thought that any of the content is wrong. But I think they could have
done better. Of course this is a good overview about problems of security and privacy, but
for its length, it only has few information that really concern privacy and security (maybe
that’s why I never thought of anything to be wrong – few information means few possibilities
to give wrong information). Their introduction to this matter (with all its information about
smart vehicles) is in my opinion much too long. People who are concerned about security and
privacy of smart vehicles should know what possibilities there are to use these cars. They
also look at only two points of privacy and security. This wouldn’t be bad if they had looked
deeper into them (especially on the matter of electronic license plates they just touch the
surface in my opinion).
On the other hand, I have to emphasize that this paper is the only one that really looked
into this topic of privacy and security. The only other one I found concerning this topic was
“Security Issues in a Future Vehicular Network” by El Zarki et al. [ZMTV02], but it just
touches some security issues while totally ignoring the privacy part. To be more precise, they
think that there is no confidential data transferred in a vehicular network.
5 Electronic license plates – A protocol
As the idea of electronic license plates is only roughly described, I would like to discuss in this
report a more concrete solution. Of course we need a central authority that administrates
all information about all cars. It is responsible for all changes concerning electronic license
plates like changing pseudonyms or registering new cars and is the only authority that is able
to connect a car’s pseudonym to its owner or to certify a pseudonym. In my solution, it has
to store (in addition to the owner’s personal data) the current symmetric key Kc, the current
pseudonym Pc and a one-way hash function F that does not change over time for each car.
The car itself stores Kc, Pc, F and a certificate Cc for its current pseudonym. All the internal
data should never be visible to the car’s owner or any other person.
5.1 Establishing connections – authentication phase
The vehicle periodically sends out its pseudonym along with the corresponding certificate
to identify itself against other vehicles (for example to be registered after an accident) or
base stations that belong to the central authority. (Cars also send out other data like traffic
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information etc., but I will focus on the electronic license plates.) If it wants to communicate
with a base station, it adds this communication request to the outgoing message. As soon as
a base station receives this connection request or wants to establish this connection for other
reasons (e.g. to inform the vehicle of an upcoming traffic jam), it contacts its central database
and reports that it wants to start communicating with the vehicle with the pseudonym Pc.
The central authority generates a challenge Ch and calculates F (Ch) (of course by using
the F corresponding to Pc). Then it provides to the base station these two values and the
current symmetric key Kc. B now sends the encrypted Ch to the car. The car calculates
F (Ch) and encrypts it with Kc. After having received this value from the vehicle, the base
station compares it to the one received from the central authority. If they match, both
communication partners can communicate using Kc for encryption. A short version of this
protocol can be found in table 2.
Source Destination Message Used key
V B Pc, Cc(, “New connection please!”) -
B C “Give me the connection data for Pc please!” -
C generates Ch, and calculates F (Ch)
C B Ch, F (Ch), Kc -
B V Ch Kc
V B F (Ch) Kc
B compares values, on match: connection established
Table 2: Establishing an encrypted connection between base station B and vehicle V using
central authority C
5.2 Changing pseudonyms
As mentioned in section 3.1, pseudonyms have to change over time or else anybody who once
found out about the connection between pseudonym and real car would always know where
to find the car.
By following the upcoming protocol, a vehicle is able to change its pseudonym and the current
symmetric key as soon as it wants to. First we need an encrypted connection between the car
and a base station (use an existing one or create one as explained in section 5.1). Now the
vehicle sends its request to change both the pseudonym and the key to the base station which
passes the message to its central authority. The central authority randomly chooses a new
pseudonym Pn(that is still available) and a new random key Kn, generates a valid certificate
Cn for the new pseudonym, and locks this car’s data so that no other base station can apply
for another new pseudonym for this car. After receiving these three values from the central
authority, the base station passes the new pseudonym and the new key to the vehicle. As
soon as it received the confirmation (already encrypted using the new key Kn) of getting this
data from the vehicle, it sends the new certificate Cn to the car. Now the new pseudonym,
key and certificate can be used instead of the old ones. To complete this change, the car
needs to send out its new identification including Pn and Cn and the request to establish a
new encrypted connection. The central authority will unlock the car’s data and only use the
new pseudonym after receiving the corresponding message from the base station. Table 3
gives you a short version of the protocol.
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Source Destination Message Used key
V B “New pseudonym please!” Kc
B C “New pseudonym for Pc please!” -
C chooses Pn and Kn, generates Cn, and locks data
C B Pn, Kn, Cn -
B V Pn, Kn Kc
V B “okay” Kn
B V Cn Kn
V B Pn, Cn, “New connection please!” -
B C “Give me the connection data for Pc!” -
C unlocks data
Table 3: Changing pseudonyms (vehicle V , base station B, and central authority C)
5.3 Additional explanations
5.3.1 Establishing connections – authentication phase
I based this protocol on the GSM authentication protocol [MoST94] which also has three
involved parties (similar to my three parties car, base station, and central authority). The
authentication works nearly the same with two differences: First we don’t use keys per session
that change every time we contact a base station like GSM does. I don’t think this is
necessary as we are able to change the key as soon as the vehicle wants a new one. But we
get an advantage out of this which leads us to the second difference: the challenge and the
corresponding answer are communicated encrypted. The advantage of this change is that our
secret function F is better protected. Without encryption it would be possible to fake a base
station and challenge a car as often as needed to find out about F because we receive the
corresponding answer from the car. With encryption the car finds out about the fake base
station as soon as it decrypts the challenge and the text doesn’t match the usual challenge
pattern. So it can ignore this challenge instead of giving any information about its secret
function F .
5.3.2 Changing pseudonyms
The pseudonym changing protocol is designed to be able to be interrupted at any time without
the possibility of having a car with no valid pseudonym and certificate. As we have established
an encrypted connection before demanding a new pseudonym, we don’t need to worry about
security. So I will concentrate on explaining how the system works in case of an interrupted
connection.
As long as the communication is interrupted before C locks the data, nothing important has
happened and the car has to repeat its request for a new pseudonym. If the interrupt happens
after unlocking the data, the change of pseudonym and key is finished and we can use the
new values just like the old ones before the change.
But if we interrupt the change while the data is locked, there could be a problem with the
locked data. However, I will prove that it is not the case. When we lose the connection after
we received the new certificate for the new pseudonym, the change is done. As soon as we try
connect to another base station with our new pseudonym, the central authority will unlock
the data and also use the new pseudonym instead of the old one (as if the car had contacted
the base station used for changing its pseudonym).
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If the connection is interrupted before the vehicle has its new certificate, the change is in-
complete. The car will still send out its old certified pseudonym to identify itself to its
surroundings (and will have to request a new pseudonym if wanted). When a base station
requests the corresponding connection data from the central authority, the central authority
realizes that the old pseudonym is still in use, deletes the newly generated values, and unlocks
the data (the old data). A timeout mechanism (which would delete the new data after a while
of not having a connection attempt with the new data) is not needed. It could even result in
errors if the car just left the range of the base station from which it got its new pseudonym
and can’t find a new base station to communicate with.
The last case is that a car sends out its old pseudonym and after that receives its new
certificate. As this could result in a very unpleasant situation (the car uses its new pseudonym
which the central authority has deleted), we simply disallow sending out the old pseudonym
during a change of pseudonym. If the change does not finish early enough before we need to
identify ourselves, we have to use the old pseudonym. But in this case, the change is handled
as if it never happened, meaning the car needs to demand a brand new pseudonym over a
new connection to a base station (by establishing a new connection we delete the “old new”
values).
5.3.3 Other design decisions
There are some other things that need to be looked at when designing these electronic license
plates which are not necessary for the protocol. In order to be able to use the recordings
of other cars that noticed a car fleeing from an accident, the central authority would have
to store all pseudonyms ever used by a car along with the corresponding date and time.
Depending on the frequency of the car’s pseudonyms change, this could be a huge amount
of data per car (much more than just the personal data). But the change needs to be quite
frequent to avoid leaving a trace, so we have to be very careful when we decide how high
this frequency shall be. A change of pseudonyms should not take place at a certain time
(e.g. exactly once per hour) but should be at least partially random. Else anybody tracking
a car could just wait until this certain time and then use the new pseudonym this car sends
out at this specific time. It should be the same with the frequency of sending out your own
identification. If you send out your pseudonym e.g. exactly once per minute, an attacker
could just wait until the correct moment to get the new pseudonym you just received.
Of course there are other design criteria like length of key and pseudonym (longer means
more security but also more communication) or the infrastructure of base stations and the
central authority (How many connections to cars are possible at once?), but these are quite
specific and not needed for this protocol outline.
6 Conclusion
As only few people have ever worked on the issue of privacy and security in communicating
cars, I think the paper gives a good approach to the issue. The protocol which gives a more
concrete solution of authenticating and changing pseudonyms than the idea of electronic
license plates mentioned in the paper is surely not designed to be the only solution in this
matter, but it is a first attempt. Until we really have all our cars equipped with the needed
technology, many years will pass and mobile communication will advance. We also need to
find someone who can finance this whole infrastructure of base stations before we can develop
electronic license plates efficiently. Until then we will stick to our old fashioned license plates...
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Review of “MDDV: A Mobility-Centric Data Dissemination
Algorithm for Vehicular Networks”
Jean-Thomas Célette
Abstract
Due to the technical progress of electronic in-vehicle equipment as well as communication
and localization devices like GPS, driving has become far more comfortable and secure.
These advances more and more also focus on vehicle to vehicle communication, meaning
the ability of two or more cars to exchange information about presence, location and
potential dangers or to exchange such information with roadside access points. A major
problem in the conception of such peer to peer vehicle networks is caused by the constant
mobility of the cars and the unpredictable density of the network users. The MDDV
algorithm has been designed to handle and exploit this particular property. The main
idea lies in using the mobility of the network to help transporting the information by using
geographical information to enhance message forwarding. MDDV makes every network
user a router by combining both network-specific knowledge, geopositional information
and the message purpose.
1 Introduction
During the past twenty years, computers and related applications have found their place in
nearly every task. Not at last have they been used to enhance security and comfort in ve-
hicles. The latest interests focus on in car-communication. Mobile internet access and the
ability to exchange data between multiple vehicles is more and more on the way to become
a challenge for modern car design. On the VANET conference and on the ACM MobiCom
workshop different ideas and research results about these Vehicle related Networks are pre-
sented and discussed. Topics concern network architectures for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,
Feasibility studies, performance test, general questions about the physical network layers and
the communication protocols themselves.
A usual approach to mobile communication is similar to mobile computing in wireless net-
works. Roadside access points, that are part of a big wired network, provide a wireless
network for moving vehicles. Thus, vehicles use the access points as gateways, as a mobile
computer uses a wireless access point. A different approach to mobile networks is the design
of mobile ad hoc networks, meaning that vehicles communicate directly with other vehicles.
This approach compensates the lack in the density of access points and is cheaper to realize.
But on the other hand, complex protocols have to be designed to provide message forwarding
and other services. Due to the unpredictable and unreliable structure of networks composed
of mobile nodes, the challenges of vehicle to vehicle networks are quite different to those of
classical static network topologies. Different proposals have been made for message dissemi-
nation in such mobile ad hoc networks. Message dissemination basically means the transport
of a data block from one place/node to another place/node. MDDV is an algorithm that
actually exploits these compromising properties of the vehicle ad hoc networks to enhance
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message dissemination in mobile networks. In this text we will describe and explain this
algorithm.
This text is a technical report that was made in the framework of the VANET seminar at
the University of Karlsruhe. It is mainly based on a paper by Hao Wu, Richard Fujimoto,
Randall Guensler and Michael Hunter called MDDV: A Mobility-Centric Data Dissemination
Algorithm for Vehicular Networks that was presented at the VANET Conference in October
2004. The paper offers an easy approach to V2V networks and to MDDV. It presents the
algorithm and some testing results in a well structured text. The terminology of this technical
report will mostly be the same as in the referred paper. In the second section of this text we
present the paper, resume it and explain or illustrate some parts of it. In the third section
we will discuss it, mainly by evaluating the simulation results presented in the paper and in
other related documents. In section four we will make proposals for future development based
on MDDV, by mainly trying to augment its reliability. Advantages of hybrid architectures
will also be discussed in section 4. We will finally conclude the paper in section 5.
2 Presentation of the Paper
2.1 Vehicle to Vehicle Networks (V2V)
In its second section, the referred paper presents properties and global goals of V2V ad-hoc
networks. MDDV requires some global and environmental information including the current
position of the car, a geographical road map, as well as engine statistics, crash reports and
so on. These informations are provided by technical equipment such as a GPS device and
different sensors that are assumed to be available on the vehicle. With the GPS device a
vehicle knows its position at any time, and thus the position can be used to compute the
behavior. Anyway the vehicles only know their own position, but not the position of their
neighbors, in order to maintain a minimum of privacy. Of course each vehicle running MDDV
needs a wireless network device like a IEEE 802.11 compliant network interface. However,
MDDV does not assume itself to be available on every vehicle, as at the beginning only a few
will be equipped.
MDDVs goal is to achieve message forwarding on a very special type of network. Therefore
it is based and uses the very special characteristics of this network. In the paper these
characteristics are assumed to be as follows:
• the nodes are constantly moving and their movement can be used for message trans-
portation. The mobility is regular and predictable as vehicles move along roads and are
constrained by traffic regulations
• the network architecture is constantly changing due to the high mobility of the nodes
• the nodes are following predefined roads therefore their movement can be assimilated
to a one-dimensional trajectory
• the total distance between nodes can be very large; the networks size can in principle
be as big as the road network
• the nodes are unequally repartited: in some areas the node density is very high and
between such areas it can be very low so that the topology can be assimilated to inter-
connected islands [DoTH02].
• the equipped vehicles can be failing (whole vehicle, part of the equipment, network
connection)
Seminar – Ad-Hoc Netzwerke für die Kommunikation zwischen Fahrzeugen
Presentation of the Paper 65
• the power consumption of the equipment does not require special power sources and
the power sources are reliable (no loss of power)
The authors of the paper say that these properties influence the design of the V2V networks.
The partitioned highly mobile network topology make big logical structures (as the network
graph) obsolete. It makes no sense to precompute the route of a message through a network
if the network structure may change every moment causing the route not to exist anymore.
The longer (in terms of nodes) a route is, the more probable it is that one segment is cut.
So it is rather desirable to use a localized routing algorithm that only compounds nodes that
are directly accessible.
As a directly accessible node is not completely reliable and may not be able to replicate a
message any further, it is useful to replicate the message to augment its chance of reaching
the destination node.
The main design parameters and objectives concern the effectiveness of the V2V network. The
authors distinguish four primary design objectives: a low delay, a high reliability, a low need
of memory and a reduced message overhead, meaning the ratio of unnecessarily sent messages.
The delay means the time that a node needs to forward an information and it is usually low
when the reliability is high. A big high message overhead also increases the memory needs,
as it has to be stored on multiple nodes. The reliability mainly depends on the networks
structure and increases with the message redundancy, e.g. with the overhead. It seems that
the first parameters (delay and reliability) oppose to the overhead and memory needs. But of
course the overhead leads to a higher network load and a higher network load would decrease
the reliability and increase the delay times. Thus the overhead (redundancy) needs to be
controlled to make sure the network does not get jammed by messages replicating in any way
or nodes sending the same message more than once. To enable such a controlling system,
information has to be placed in the message header, which will results in higher memory needs.
Anyway, such information is no bigger than a few bytes, and the messages themselves being
potentially short, they can be stored without needing much memory, compared to current
memory sizes.
Other design parameters concern the dissemination of the messages. A main difference be-
tween usual peer to peer (P2P) networks and the V2V networks is that in P2P networks
communication happens between two specific nodes in both directions, whereas in V2V net-
works it often involves one vehicle sending a message to one or more vehicles in a certain
area. Those can be specific vehicles or might not. Using a usual IP-similar protocol would
highly increase the network traffic as only one specific node can be reached. This would not
satisfy the applications of V2V networks.In the paper the authors distinguish between four
data dissemination semantics:
• unicast with precise location means sending a message to a specific node at a specific
location so that the message reaches its destination before a specific time
• unicast with approximate location means sending a message to a specific node which
actual location is unknown but a previous location is known and its actual location can
be guessed in a certain area
• multicast means the dissemination of a message to all vehicle in a certain region: for
example all vehicles within a circle around a specified position
• anycast means sending a message to at least one node of a certain type in a specific
region: for example ”‘send to any police car”’
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Each of these message forwarding systems has its own application in V2V networks. Multicast
can be useful for warning vehicles in a certain area of to request information (e.g. about traffic
density) in a certain area. Later in the text a difference is made between local multicast and
multicast for a remote location. An application for local multicast could be to send a warning
to all surrounding cars. Another application could be to use information of the cars stability
program (ESP, ASC and how these systems are called) to automatically warn surrounding
cars when the road seems to be icy. Unicast can be used to send such information back or to
warn a nearby car. Anycasts application can be the sending of distress messages. Of course
many more application of these dissemination semantics can be found.
Those properties of V2V networks and the design objectives for the forwarding algorithm bring
up three main properties of MDDV: as the nodes are highly mobile and the communication
does not happen between specific nodes but between nodes that are chosen because of their
location, MDDV can not be node centric as we would expect it from IP-routing protocols but
needs to belocation centric e.g. the main transmission criteria is that a message gets closer to
its destination region. The second main characteristic of MDDV is that for transmission over
numerous segments, a node can not know if an immediate connection is possible. Therefore
opportunistic forwarding has been introduced meaning that messages are stored until the
opportunity to send the message to some other nodes presents itself. The third property
concerns the number of nodes the message is forwarded to; if there is no certainty that there
is a way to the destination over the node with the closest position to the destination, the
message has to be transferred to another node. Therefore messages have to be redundantly
forwarded.
2.2 Presentation of MDDV
The third section of the paper is the biggest one and it presents the MDDV algorithm itself.
It explains how multicast to a distant region is done. A pseudo code implementation is shown
in the section 4.
As described in the previous section, one of the main objectives is to deliver messages as soon
as possible. Therefore it is necessary to determinate the path that can carry the message
the fastest. The easiest way to handle this seems to be taking the shortest path. But the
traffic density has a main influence on the message propagation, as a high node density would
allow a faster message propagation. To handle factors as traffic density our authors have
introduced the dissemination length. Like the path length is used as the edge-weight when
solving shortest path problems the dissemination length decreases when a road offers good
possibilities to transport a message, e.g. when it has a higher traffic density. As traffic density
is difficult to determinate our authors assume that the more lanes a road has, the higher the
traffic density is e.g. a four lane highway will not only be faster for vehicles to drive but also
for messages to be forwarded than a one lane country road. The formula that determines the
dissemination length d(A, B) between a point A and a point B is the heuristic formula
d(A,B) = r(A,B) · (m − (m − 1)(ip + cjp)) 0 < c < 1
where r(A,B) is the road length of the chosen path. The global idea of the formula is that
the road distance is multiplied with a formula based on other parameters:
• i is the number of lanes from A to B and j the number of lanes from B to A
• p and m are some formula specific parameters that are used to influence the the weight
of the parameters. p associates the car density to the number of lanes. It is unlikely that
the number of lanes will be linear on the number of cars per road-length-unit. In the
tests p has been set to 0.1 meaning that on a 2 lane road there are 1.07 times as much
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cars than on a 1 lane road. m influences the weight that the lane-number parameters
have compare to the road length and has been set to 5 for testing.
• as vehicles moving in the opposite propagation direction are less useful than vehicles
moving in that direction the parameter c has been introduced to lower the advantage
caused by opposite lanes. In the test c has been set to 0.05.
The dissemination length of a path joining two distant regions will be the sum of the dis-
semination length of the road segments. Of course the dissemination length requires that a
precise road map with lane information is available to the system.
2.3 Message heads in localized networks
As presented in the the section 2.1 MDDV was going to be a localized algorithm as only local
knowledge is present at computation time. Anyway, the collective behavior of all the nodes
involved in a message forwarding has to reach the objectives. In the semantic of multicast the
algorithm has two main objectives: bringing the message to the destination region (here called
forwarding phase) and then transmitting it to every node in there (here called propagation
phase).
While propagation is rather easy to implement, message forwarding is rather complex. In
theory it would be best to only let the node that is the closest to the destination region (here
called message head) send the message to avoid information overflow. In practical this would
not work because there is no perfect knowledge, meaning that not every vehicle can know the
real message head at any time. If the message head leaves its trajectory or stops or becomes
inoperative, there is no message head left and the message forwarding would stop and the
message would get lost. Also if the message head travels in the wrong direction, sending
the message before it crosses another vehicle, the other vehicle would not know it is the new
message head unless it knows that the other vehicle is moving away from the destination
region.
To handle these problems MDDV allows multiple vehicles to forward the message as long as
they are near the message head.
Information about the message head, that is constantly updated, has to be available to every
message holder. The best way to handle this is to have some metadata being carried within
the message. This metadata would be, agreeing to our authors the location of the last message
head when it sent the message and the corresponding time. The message head information
would only be updated when a message head moves closer towards the destination region or
when a new vehicle becomes the message head. To design this, the notions of message head
candidate and non-message head candidate have been introduced. A message head candidate
is a node which can with some probability assume that it is the real message head, e.g. when
it is closer to the destination region than the current message head. For this purpose the
message head pair (l, t) has been introduced where l gives the location of the actual message
head and t the time at which the message head had the position l. Thus, the authors consider
two state-swhiches:
A non-message head becomes a message head:
• if it receives a message with a message head location (l) that is farther from the desti-
nation region
• if it passes the message head location (l) within a time that is defined as a system
parameter
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A message head becomes a non-message head:
• if it receives the same message with another message head pair (l, t) where l is closer
to the destination region
• if it leaves the trajectory or moves away from the destination region trajectory
It is also required that a message holder updates its messages head pair if a newer one is
received.
2.4 Data transmission
The next concern is about the transmission protocol used for data exchange. As an exchange
protocol based on logical structures like trees, graphs or clusters can not be implemented in
an unpredictable network like V2V, MDDV will have to focus on peer-to-peer connections
and only be able to directly communicate with other nodes that are in reach. This makes
the transmission protocol different to known protocols like IP where packets are addressed
to a gateway if the destination host is not reachable within the network. In addition to
that, the transmission must be able to address a message to any reachable host (as presented
in 2.1) e.g. must be location centric. Thus, multiple receivers must be able to receive the
same message within one transmission. That broadcasting property influences the possible
data exchange semantics: a three way interaction would be difficult to implement, as the
message sender would have to interact with multiple receivers at one time, and the idea of
broadcasting could not be realized. Therefore, the best way to allow broadcasting is a one-way
data exchange. The sender simply sends the messages when receivers are reachable (remember
that all nodes are supposed to broadcast their id, independently from the transmission). This
also supports the general idea of data dissemination and opportunistic forwarding and reduces
the transmitted data to its minimum, which can be compared to a reduction of the overhead.
Furthermore, the data exchange algorithm is distributed in two phases: the forwarding phase,
objecting the transmission from the source to the destination region, and the propagation
phase, making sure that every vehicle in the destination area receives the message.
2.4.1 The forwarding phase
The authors distinguish 2 states that both enable message propagation during the forwarding
phase: the active and the passive state. In the active state, a node replicates a message as
soon as it receives a newer version of it and also sends the newest version of the message
that it has stored in its memory when an older version of the message is received (older here
means that the l parameter is farther from the destination area. It also resends the message
each time a new vehicle shows up. They call this the full protocol. A node in the passive
state will only transmit the message if it receives an older version of the message e.g. for
error correction.
A node is in the active state as long as its location and time are within a certain gap from the
message head pair. When this distance (location and time) is transgressed the node turns to
the passive state as long as it stays in another certain distance from the message head pair.
Out of this region the node does not transmit the message anymore.
2.4.2 Propagation phases
The propagation phase is much easier. The node does either transmit the message or does
not: as long as both time and position are within a certain distance from the message head
pair, the message is transmitted. Out of this distance, it isn’t.
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2.5 Implementation of MDDV
In the text a pseudo code implementation, that solves a part of the multicast problem, is
provided. It implements three lists or queues as data structures to keep track of events:
• a neighbor list that contains the list of the neighboring nodes in their order of appearance
• an opportunistic message list containing the messages that have already been transmit-
ted and are waiting to be transmitted to new neighbors
• a scheduled message list, that contains the message that have to be transmitted in the
order they were inserted
Periodically the node sends the scheduled messages or sends messages that are stored in the
opportunistic message list and that were last sent before a new neighbor showed up.
The second part of the implementation regards what is done when a new message ar-
rives.When a new message arrives, the algorithm behaves differently depending on if the
message was already known or not.
• When the message has already been received, the new message head pair is compared
to the message head pair of the stored message. If the message head pair of the new
message is significantly newer than the message in memory, the message is added to
the scheduled list. If it is insignificantly newer or insignificantly older it is added to the
opportunistic message list (and only the newest head pair is kept). If it is significantly
older the message is added to the scheduled list (with the newer head pair).
• When the message is unknown, it is whether added to the opportunistic list or to the
scheduled list, depending on its state, active or passive as defined in the previous section.
The case that the message is not eligible to be transmitted at all is not implemented.
2.6 Discussion
Section 5 of our referred text discusses the design of the algorithm and resumes the potential
failures of the algorithm. It also gives an idea about what future research work has to be
done, which is also discussed in sections 7 and 8 of our text. That question will also be
addressed in one of the following sections of this report.
In its second part section 5 discusses the other data dissemination semantics that have been
addressed in the section 2. It globally says that the other data transmission semantics can be
handled by modifying multicast. Unicast corresponds to the forwarding phase of multicast,
scan is a special case of unicast and anycast is similar to scan. Of course, the localized
approach of multicast (when the source is within the destination region) can be regarded as
a special case of the discussed multicast. The similarity of these semantics offers new design
possibilities which will be mentioned in part 3 of this report.
2.7 Realized Testing
In the text the authors have dedicated a section to the realized testing of MDDV. Unfortu-
nately only a few results of the test are shown, but let’s first explain the testing system.
No real testing has been done on MDDV yet, but a simulation system was built up. It basically
consist of two interacting software systems, one called CORSIM [t08a], used to simulate the
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behavior of the vehicles, and the other, QualNet [t08b] used to simulate the behavior of
a Wireless Network. According to the frederal highway association (FHWA) CORSIM is
a comprehensive microscopic traffic simulation, applicable to surface streets, freeways, and
integrated networks with a complete selection of control devices (i.e., stop/yield sign, traffic
signals, and ramp metering). CORSIM also simulates traffic and traffic control systems using
commonly accepted vehicle and driver behavior models. For the testing, the MDDV team has
simulated the morning rush hour traffic in the northwest quadrant of Atlanta, corresponding
to 12 KM of the I-75 Corridor and 160 KM of streets.
MDDV has been implemented as an application level protocol to be run on the described
testing system. Beside MDDV two other data-dissemination schemes have been implemented
for comparison purposes. Both are unrealistic. The first one, called central intelligence
scheme, is based on the assumption that any car, knows the identity of the message head
at any time. So there is no loss of message possible and only the message head propagating
the message. This is of course not realistic because is there is no way to have such a perfect
knowledge in a V2V network.
The second approach is the P2P scheme that does not implement any message head at all so
that every vehicle propagates the message every time another node comes across.
MDDV is a mixture of the two other schemes, that’s why comparison makes sense. The
concrete simulation involved a strain of 40 geographical-temporal multicasts with a message
size of 512 bytes over an average road distance of 6.5 km. The radio range was set at 250m
with an IEEE 802.11DCF device. The message expiration time was set to 480 seconds (8
minutes), meaning that after that time the message would not be forwarded anymore.
3 Evaluation
3.1 Test results
To discuss the provided test results let us first introduce some notions:
• the delivery ratio is the fraction of the message that are delivered within the expiration
time compared to the total amount of messages that were sent
• the penetration ratio is the fraction of MDDV capable cars compared to the total amount
of cars on the road
• the delay is the time that a message takes until it reaches the destination.
The test results shown in figures — show the relation between quality criteria as delay or
delivery ratio with the penetration ratio. The figures are taken from the referred text.
In Figure 1 the delivery ratio is at 60% for a penetration ratio of 10% which is quite insufficient.
At a penetration ratio equal of greater to 20% the delivery ratio is more or less constant at
90% which is an acceptable quote. But a penetration rate of 20% is extremely high because
it would take a long time until this quote of equipped cars is achieved. Unfortunately there
is no such data available for the other idealized dissemination semantics.
Figure 2 shows the maximum, minimum and average dissemination time of the messages,
where messages that have reached the timeout are not taken in account. The average is
between 100 and 200 seconds, while the delay sinks when the penetration ratio augments.
On the first sight 200 seconds (at a penetration ratio of 20%), is very long if one remembers
that the average distance is 6.5 km. 200 seconds being only one way dissemination, a car
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Figure 1: Delivery Ratio
requesting traffic information for a location that is 6.5 km away will wait approximately 400
seconds for the answer. In [WLHF+04] current average speeds on a highway like I-75 are 60
mph (96.5608 km/h) and 15 to 25 mph (24.1402 to 40.2336 km/h) on a street. In 400 seconds
a vehicle can respectively cover a distance of 10.7 km at 60, 4,470 km at 25 and 2.6 km at
15 mph. So obviously such a request will not make sense on the I-75 because the destination
region will be passed before the sender gets the reply. At 25 mph the results might arrive too
late but at the low speed of 15 mph they might still be useful. A second aspect of the test
results shown in figure 2 is the difference between the average delay time and the maximum
and minimum delay. The minimum delay is near to 0 seconds, whereas it must be considered
that this could be due to the destination region being chosen next to the source node, as
6.5 km is only the average distance. Also the maximum delay of delivered messages being
close to the expiration time can simply be due to the same fact as no upper limit is given
for the destination region. The empirical variance for a fixed road distance would be more
significant for the testing. Indeed, other studies on data dissemination as [WLHF+04] show
similar results: ”‘the message propagation delay is highly variable except when vehicle density
becomes saturated. A particular delay may be well below or above the average, depending
on prevailing traffic conditions.”’
Figure 2: Dissemination Delay
This variance in the message delay highly affects the reliability of the protocol. Furthermore it
can empirically be admitted that the delivery ratio falls and the dissemination delay linearly
grows when the dissemination path gets longer. The average delivery ratio of 0.6 at 10%
penetration ratio would show awful results on longer paths. A request over a 13 km route,
which is a reasonable distance to obtain traffic information Would have a delivery ratio of
0.6*0.6 = 0.36 . If we assume that that request is made by an anycast, so that only one
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Jean-Thomas Célette: Review of “MDDV: A Mobility-Centric Data Dissemination
Algorithm for Vehicular Networks”
vehicle answers it, the delivery ration of the answer would be even lower. According to the
penetration ratio of GPS devices in cars in the early 90s, it cannot be assumed that more
than 10% of vehicles are equipped with MDDV and the required devices within the first year
on the market. And these bad results would discourage the consumers so that the delivery
ratios at 20% penetration ratio (almost 100%) will never be reached, and that is a major
problem opposing to the integration of such a system.
The other test results showing MDDV in comparison with the two idealized dissemination
algorithm are less significant. Figure 3 shows the delivery ratio of MDDV normalized against
this of P2P and it appears to be lower than the delivery ratio of MDDV itself. This is due to
the fact that the test use an MDDV implementation with reduced message overhead, what
actually makes MDDV nearly comparable to central intelligence -but without the perfect
knowledge. Thus this delivery ratio is not that significant.
Figure 3: Normalized Delivery Ratio
Figure 4 showing the message overhead for this particularly overhead-low MDDV implemen-
tation shows that the overhead is nearly as low as the one of central intelligence which cannot
be surprising. On the other hand, it appears that the message overhead is very low, mostly
< 5%. Such a small message overhead can not be affecting the network reliability. It is also
astonishing that Central Intelligence has any message overhead at all: as every vehicle has
perfect knowledge of the message head at any time, no unnecessary message should be sent
out. The minimum overhead at 20% penetration rate fits with the maximum in the delivery
ratio, but cannot be explained with these test results.
Figure 4: Normalized Message Overhead
The simulation results show that with the right parameters, MDDV can be a reliable dis-
semination algorithm. Prognostics on dynamic MDDV parameters are made in section 4.
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The results also show that the effectiveness of MDDV mainly depends on the penetration
ratio. Similar results are shown in [WLHF+04]. They confirm that a minimum penetration
ratio of 20% is needed for acceptable results. Figure 6 shows a very low connectivity for a
penetration ratio less than 15% and a 100% connectivity while the penetration ratio is at
least 20%. Similar results can be observed for the delay time.
[WLHF+04] also reveals another weakness of V2V connectivity that also affects MDDV. All
the simulations we have considered yet, assume whether morning or evening rush-hour in
Atlanta. Thus the reliability of V2V networks in general mainly depends on traffic density,
and at low circulation time like nighttime, the reliability is much worse. Simulation results
shown in [WuFR03] also confirm this.
The simulation results published in the text also do not show how the dissemination-path-
length affects the reliability as only an average distance of 6.5 km is given. It can be admitted
that reliability gets worse when the path gets longer, but it is important to know if it come
to a physical limit when using MDDV, and if system parameters need to be adapted for long
distance messages (e.g. Having a timeout that is proportional to the dissemination length).
On the other hand, when roadside access points can be used in hybrid architectures the
dissemination path that consists over the V2V network is limited as well.
Another problem that’s not addressed by the simulation is the given road infrastructure. All
simulations that we’ve seen are made in Atlanta, a big city, and in big cities you’ve always
got vehicles on the road. What about country roads? Is a V2V network possible on a country
road? We can assume it isn’t when the traffic density is too low. A possibility to handle this
problem will also be presented in section 4.4.
3.2 Dissemination Path
In the text it is unclear whether multiple dissemination paths can be used. Section 3.2 says
that the path that will be taken is the path with the smallest sum of weights. Actually it is
not specified whether this path is computed once by the message source and packed into the
message, which will result in a larger message size, or if it is recomputed at every hop, which
means more computing time, as this problem is NP-complete and needs a high computing
time. In the case the message is recomputed, the path may not be unique. The reach of the
wireless device is supposed to be 250m. 250m is a lot, and thus it is possible that two nodes
on two different roads receive the message and each node propagates the message which may
result in multiple trajectories.
3.3 Message head
Let us consider a vehicle that drives slowly on a road, transporting a message. Assume that
a fast vehicle comes on the road, broadcasting its ID. The slow vehicle will send the message,
the fast one receive it, but before the faster vehicle sends it with a new message head pair the
two vehicles come out of reach. This way the same message might get forwarded redundantly.
This phenomena might get amplified when the vehicles drive in a city with buildings and other
vehicles on the road that might suddenly jam a transmission. Changing the lane is sufficient
to suddenly have a truck in the way that might break the transmission. In general, it can be
said that wireless ad-hoc networks have a limited reliability by themselves and that property
is not watched in the algorithm design. All these things may affect the message overhead,
because redundant forwarding actually doubles the number of transmitted messages.
These aspects of wireless ad hoc networks have also not been taken into account for the
simulation.
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4 Further development
The MDDV algorithm provides a service for message dissemination in V2V networks. Thus
applications for MDDV have to be designed and implemented. An important aspect of
V2V communication and MDDV in particular is that it provides only a one-way connec-
tion. MDDV provides a service similar to UDP in IP connections. An other aspect of V2V
communication is a easily changing reliability that hardly depends on the localized network
architecture and node repartition. In general, such a system prefers short messages, but when
the connectivity is good e.g. when the nodes are close to each other bigger messages can be
exchanged and even connection orientated point to point transmissions could be implemented.
The following parts ask general questions on protocols that could be based on MDDV and
propose some design parameters.
4.1 Dynamic message length and predefined messages
An approach to make MDDV scalable to the connectivity degree consists in building a protocol
on MDDV that provides basic services, and also the ability to transfer longer messages. Such
a system could allow it to distant vehicles with an unreliable connectivity to only exchange
basic information with a very short message template. Vehicles being close to each other,
that therefore benefit on a high connectivity, resulting in a fast connection could run higher
level protocols like TCP/IP or similar protocols to exchange higher amounts of data like
movies or propagate internet access or permit inter-vehicle network gaming as suggested in
[WLHF+04]. This way we would implement short messages for unreliable connectivity and
longer messages when the connectivity is good. This option could well be implemented in the
message header, and some basic messages like a be careful or police car request or what is
the traffic like at position p? could be implemented as standard messages to make them very
short. Of course the message format must provide different possibilities depending on the
message’s semantic. Unicast does not make sense when combined with a traffic information
request or a police car request.
To start making a proposal about the message format let us first think what all types of
messages need in commen on their header. Basically there would be the sender ID, where
Ids must be unique as MAC-Addresses and would therefore need 12 HEX numbers e.g. 6
bytes. As well a message should always contain the senders location and the sending time.
Time and date can be stored in 4 bytes and the two position variables in 2 bytes each. The
expiration time needs another 2 bytes. To implement predefined messages another byte can
be used (256 possibilities should be enough). We will call this byte the message describer, and
beside the standard messages it could also hold the dissemination semantic. Longer messages
can be handled as a special case, and another one or two bytes would specify the length. If
the message describer needs arguments, we admit these must immediately follow the message
describer. Such arguments can consist in addresses (only for unicast), in locations (unicast,
anycast, multicast), and other arguments like direction, speed and so on. At last the message
format should provide an error check system or even some redundancy, because the service
is connection-less and an erroneous message can hardly be corrected. This should not make
problems as the total message size for short messages as we have proposed them is very small
as it should not exceed 30 bytes.
The smaller a message is, the less it jams the network, and the more it can be replicated
without producing an important overhead. Thus, it can be thought to implement MDDV
to let it prefer short messages and to let them take multiples paths, whereas long messages
forwarding is optimized to reduce the overhead. Of course it must be thought that some long
messages need a high reliability too, and, by the way, what would it bring to have a traffic
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information request being delivered within seconds when the answer never arrives? The other
question is about the achievement when using multiple paths.
4.2 Multiple paths
In the text a suggestion was made about using multiple path, and in the Evaluation part
we have seen that multiple path use is even possible when it is not explicitly wanted. If you
want to have multiple road-paths to be used to disseminate a message, there are different
possibilities to do this. We present the following two:
• A car hearing that the message head is closer to the destination but seems to be on
an other road (remember that every car has a GPS and a roadmap), could continue
broadcast the message on its way, obeying to the algorithm defined in the text. This
way the message could take multiple roads without having to mainly change the MDDV
algorithm.
• A car could keep the message and stay in the active forwarding state even if it moves
away from the destination region. Conditions like being closer to the destination region
than when the message was first heard and having not heard the message since at least
x meters (x > 250) would prevent from a multicast in any direction. This semantic
would be favorable to using multiple paths.
The main advantage of such a multi-path dissemination algorithm is the augmented reliability.
Especially in few and far between traffic conditions where the dissemination can easily be
stopped due to the low density of cars (imagine only one car transports the message and then
leaves the path), multi-path offers redundancy and thus a higher reliability. Of course the
message overhead grows, and multi-path dissemination is only favorable in certain conditions
and it has to be adaptive to the traffic situation.
4.3 Priority based MDDV
The two previous sections both seem to point at one thing: to rise the reliability (especially in
reducing the message delay) of certain messages without creating to much message overhead
and to implement multiple path forwarding for some messages and not for some others, the
concept of message priority has to be introduced.
Some applications of MDDV naturally require a higher priority level. Calling a police car, or
broadcasting emergency messages is highly more important than having an internet connec-
tion over a few vehicles or chatting with a neighbor. Of course a priority system could easily
be abused if the sender decides what priority level his message has. Just imagine exchanging
data with a nearby car over a few cars with MDDV. To get a more reliable connection who
wouldn’t think about giving his messages a higher priority? A way to solve this would be
to implement standard priorities, e.g. emergency messages naturally have a higher priority
than traffic situation request while those have a higher priority than user transfers like data
exchange. This can easily be implemented if a message format as the one described in 3.1
is used. As the message type would be defined in the message header a vehicle that just
forwards the message could immediately find out the message type, and thus find out its
priority and deduce the forwarding semantic to use. In addition to that, no big amount of
hidden data could be in such a predefined message, because by themselves such predefined
messages are short and only provide room for very few arguments.
For user type messages a fairness system, that prefers short messages or messages from senders
that haven’t sent a message yet, could be implemented the the network traffic is high an
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network jams occur. This would also prevent users from monopolizing the network for unim-
portant purposes.
Depending on the priority level, multi-path forwarding could be favored or not. The param-
eters proposed in the previous section on multiple-paths could be adapted depending on the
priority level. A message with a higher priority would more likely take many paths while a
lower prioritized message would be disseminated on less different road-ways. The times T1,
T2, T3 and the distances l1, l2, l3 defined in the text could as well be depending on the priority
level. This way a message holder would forward a message with a higher priority level more
often as a message with a low priority level, and it would also be more likely that the message
takes multiple paths.
These suggestions are proposals for further development of V2V networks using MDDV. Of
course further analyses and simulations have to be done to see whether these suggestions are
accurate or not, and if they are, studies and research would have to be done to determinate
values of the parameters.
4.4 MDDV and traffic density
As we’ve seen, the reliability of MDDV highly depends on traffic density. In the previous
sections we’ve discussed possibilities to adapt the reliability of MDDV. The next question we
ask is: does it make sense to adapt MDDV parameters depending on traffic density?
High traffic density augments reliability, but also increases the message overhead. Thus it
could be considered to use different dissemination schemes depending on the traffic situation.
But how can we evaluate the traffic situation? Of course, before forwarding a message a node
could send a traffic information request to choose the appropriate dissemination semantic, but
this would result in more messages that can be considered as overhead and would would not
solve the problem. Furthermore what would it bring to send a traffic information request to
send another traffic information request? The second point is that traffic density is a localized
problem, as the traffic situation may change within short ranges. Anyway it might not be
enough to adapt the dissemination scheme to the local traffic situation, because this could
end in leading the message to a place where the message never comes out because of a lack of
equipped vehicles. This is a problem that has to be faced. Other equipment providing traffic
information like radio channels or maps containing prognostic traffic information for each
road segment could help solving the problem. Anyway, one thing remains with certainty: on
a path with a lack of vehicles the reliability will surely be compromised. But when a node has
traffic information on the whole path that the message should follow, it can decide about the
dissemination semantic to use. When a path does not have sufficient traffic density or when a
road (or worse: a bridge) is closed ,the semantic an be adapted, multi pathing enabled. And
the more traffic information a vehicle has, the more loss of message can be prevented.
In an area with very low traffic density, a solution could be to couple the navigation system
and MDDV. When a car has its navigation turned on, long term prognostics can be made
about the vehicles path. Thus a message that has to be transferred through a region with
a poor traffic density could be hold by a car which will likely cross the region, e.g. If its
navigation system has computed a path through this region. Such an implementation would
of course be subject to privacy concerns, that would have to be solved.
4.5 Hybrid architectures
The last facet of MDDV we will discuss in this paper, is the deployment of MDDV in hybrid
architectures. Hybrid V2V networks consist of V2V ad hoc networks coupled with roadside
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access points that are all connected to a wired network. The main advantage of this network
architecture is that messages can be forwarded over long distances with a low delay and a
high delivery rate. The delay in the wired network is usually so low (usually a few millisec-
onds to a few seconds) that it can be neglected compared to the V2V network that handles
message-forwarding with MDDV. In result transferring messages over a long distance, is only
compromised by the distance it covers using the V2V network. Thus, in hybrid architectures,
transferring a message over 100 KM could be faster and with les overhead than another
message transfer over 2 KM, depending on the distance to the next roadside access point.
Two approaches can be made to integrate MDDV in hybrid networks:
• each node is aware of the location of the access points (for example they could be on
the map)
• or not each node knows the location of the next access point
In the first case MDDV could be configured to compute if it is preferable to send the message
to the next access point or to forward it directly to the destination region, e.g. which V2V
distance is longer. The access point would only have to compute the best situated access
point and forward the message to it. The second access point would simply run the MDDV
algorithm (with the difference that it has a fixed location).
In the second case the access point have to behave mostly in the same way, except that they
have to catch the messages an forward them if it makes sense to do so. In the case an access
point sends the message over the wired network it should notify the surrounding vehicles that
they mustn’t forward the message. The vehicles simply run MDDV.
The first approach would certainly be the better, because the delay should be lower when
access points are taken into account for path computing. In general hybrid architectures
provide a heavy advantage to pure ad hoc topologies. Similar results have been observed in
[DoTH02]. Depending on their density, roadside access points could help to solve the problem
we’ve addressed in 3. They could balance a low penetration ratio, which would facilitate the
deployment of such a system.
5 Conclusion
MDDV is an efficient approach for data dissemination in mobile ad-hoc networks. MDDV
uses the vehicles mobility and achieves its goal nearly as good as unrealistic idealized algo-
rithms. Without having a too high message overhead it approaches the reliability and delay
times of an idealized algorithm. But we’ve seen that it seems to be easily compromised by
low traffic density and low penetration ratio so that it’s deployment seems to be very diffi-
cult. Anyway it mustn’t be forgotten that the idea of MDDV is still very young, and not
much research has been done about it. And the simulation results seem to be promising
while the penetration ratio is reaching 20% with high traffic density. In the last section of
this report we have presented and accosted some methods that could augment the reliability
of V2V message dissemination. Some of these proposals could be subject to more research
and simulation in order to exploit the capabilities MDDV provides. Especially hybrid net-
work architectures seem to compensate the weaknesses of V2V networks. Another benefiting
approach is to augment the knowledge (on traffic situation, on access points or on vehicle
movement), because it can easily be used to optimize the dissemination of a message. Multi
path forwarding could also increase reliability and even seems easy to implement. In the
report, we have also made suggestions about a special message format optimized for ad hoc
networks and traffic purposes. This approach could be benefiting to any kind of partitioned,
unpredictable and partially unreliable network.
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The communication between vehicles which are outside their sending range makes it
necessary to send messages over many repeater stations. These repeaters could be either
stationary antennas or other vehicles. Besides you have to see that in urban areas it is very
possible that high buildings shadow nodes which are in the transmission range and so you
have to find a secure and stable way around them. This leeds to a new efficient protocol
which is based on IEEE 802.11 and is called UMB (Urban Multi-Hop Broadcast Protocol).
It wants to solve the problem of broadcast storm, hidden nodes and reliability problems
in urban areas. This protocol divides the road portion inside the transmission range into
sections, locates the furthest non-empty and takes then a vehicle inside. This vehicle gets
now the duty to acknowledge and forward the messages of the sender. On intersections in
the urban area there are repeaters which initiate new directional broadcasts if they are in
the transmission range of the sender. How this protocol works in detail and why it seems
to be very effective in comparison with other flooding based protocols I try to explain in
the report.
1 Introduction
Not long ago the automotive industry became interested in Inter-Vehicle Communication
Systems because they saw a chance to make their products safer, more comfortable and more
entertaining, too. Broadcast is often used in such systems. Useful applications relying on
broadcast could be the sharing of emergency, weather, traffic and road data, advertisement
and announcements. When messages are send to locations which are beyond the transmission
range then the multi-hopping method is used. (This can be compared with an airplane that
wants to travel a long distance but it has not enough fuel to do it in one straight way. So
it has to stop at several airports to get refilled and to restart the journey.) It is the fact
that through packet loss, collisions and hidden nodes the receiver cannot get its message and
beside this it is important that unnecessary retransmissions use a significant amount of the
wireless resources. Hidden nodes in urban areas are for example vehicles at road segments
which are shadowed by tall buildings and so cannot be reached by the sender. These obstacles
make it important to carefully design a protocol which nearly solves the problems and make
the traffic reliable and efficient.
Starting with a pure blind flooding without using any topology information you get redun-
dancy, contention and collision problems. There exist techniques to improve blind flooding,
but they are not effective for all ranges or node densities. And these two points change very
quickly in inter-vehicle communication systems. The next step to fix the redundancy could
be to include topology information to choose the nodes. But for high numbers of vehicles it
becomes impractical because the speed of the protocol would decrease by more data which
had to be processed. To get a solution for the hidden node and reliability problem you can
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Figure 1: Shows the hidden node problem
introduce a handshake and acknowledgement mechanism like RTS / CTS (Ready To Send /
Clear To Send). To make this clear look at Figure 1.
If a sender (A) wants to send a data packet to (B) it sends a short frame packet (RTS)
with the information about the duration of the transmission. All participants which are in
the sending direction get this packet and do not initiate sendings for a time based on this
information. If B gets this frame packet it answers also with a frame packet (CTS) which
also includes the information about the duration. Now the participants of the network which
are not in the transmission range (for example C) of A but of B will be informed that a
transmission will start soon. So they also do not send. If A gets the RTS packet it starts
sending the data.
But as long there is more than one destination this could cause packet storms around the
source. Now UMB tries to combine and expand the positive aspects of other protocol
attempts. The UMB protocol consists of two parts
1. Directional Broadcast
2. Intersectional Broadcast
In the next part I try to explain the directional broadcast where sender nodes try to select the
furthest node in the broadcast direction to assign the duty of forwarding and acknowledging
without using any topology information. The intersectional broadcast is realised through
repeaters at the intersections to forward packets to all road segments.
2 Protocol Description
Assumptions:
• Vehicles build an adhoc-network
• Simple repeaters at intersections
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• Vehicles equipped with GPS receiver and road map
The most important goals of UMB are:
1. Avoiding collisions due to hidden nodes (with handshake mechanism)
2. Using the channel efficiently (with clever selection of packet forwarder)
3. Making the broadcast communication reliable (with ACK packet mechanism)
4. Sending messages in all directions at intersections (with simple repeaters)
3 Directional Broadcast
3.1 RTB/CTB Handshake
To avoid the hidden node problem there is a RTB (Request To Broadcast) / CTB (Clear To
Broadcast) handshake implemented. The receiver of the sources RTB packet is the furthest
away node among the nodes in the sending range. So all other nodes which are between source
and receiver also receive the message and do not access the channel for a specified time in the
packet. To select the furthest away node the road portion in the transmission range is divided
into segments. These segments are only created in the direction of the dissemination. If there
is more than one vehicle in the last segment then this segment is iteratively divided in smaller
parts. If this method does not succeed then the remaining nodes in the last sub-segment
enter a random phase. The protocol can adapt the iteration steps dependent to the traffic
conditions. A RTB packet includes following
1. transmission duration
2. position of the source
3. broadcast direction
Source vehicle obey the IEEE 802.11 transmission rules (CSMA/CA) while attempting to
send an RTB packet. That means that they monitor the channel before sending to avoid
collisions.
When the vehicles on the road in the direction of the dissemination receive this packet they
compute their distance to the source. They can do this because of the header information of
the packet and knowing their position. Dependent on this distance,transmission range and
number of segments they compute the length of a jamming signal which is called black-burst.
Since two cars have not the same black-burst length it is now possible to select the furthest
node. The vehicles send their black-burst after SIFS (Shortest Inter-Frame Space) which is
the time to wait after hearing that the channel is empty. Now they change to listen-mode and
listen to the channel. If when listening the channel is empty they recognize that they are the
furthest node, because the furthest node sends the longest black-burst, which is computed as
follows in the first iteration:
L1 =  d
Range
× Nmax × SlotT ime (1)
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(b). IF CTB is RECEIVED CORRECTLY, DATA is SENT







Figure 2: Sequence of packets. (a) Second RTB/CTB handshake (b) DATA/ACK.
d is distance from source to vehicle
Range is transmission range
Nmax is the number of segments created
SlotTime is the length of one slot
After this selection this node can answer with a CTB packet. The other nodes which
could hear the burst do not try to send a CTB packet. If there are many vehicles in one
segment they will maybe all find the channel empty and all try to send a CTB. In that case
the packets will collide though the source detects the transmission but cannot decode it and
re-sends the RTB packet. But now only the nodes which sent the CTB packets join the
next iteration, where the furthest non-empty segment is splitted into Nmax sub-segments.
This procedure repeats until the successful transmission of a CTB packet to the source or
until Dmax attempts. With this formula you can compute the black-burst length for the i-th
iteration (Li):
Li = d − Llongesti−1 × Wi−1
Wi−1
× Nmax × SlotT ime (2)





Llongesti is the longest blackburst before
Wi is the segment width in the i-th iteration
The source only indicates in its RTB packet that there was a collision before and the nodes
which sent the longest black-bursts in the previous iteration are responsible to select and split
the segment. Now if this segment based method does not come to a successful ending then
the vehicles which sent a CTB in last iteration enter the random phase where they randomly
choose a black-burst length from [0, Nmax - 1] slots. If there are collisions then the colliding
nodes join the next phase and so on. This will only happen Ranmax times else the segment
based method starts from beginning. In the most cases this should not happen. If the source
gets no answer after sending the RTB packet it goes back to the first segment based iteration
and tries again after a random waiting time. The maximum attempts are given through the
RETmax parameter.
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3.2 Transmission of DATA and ACK
After ending this handshake between source and corresponding node with receiving the CTB
package the source node sends the broadcast packet. In this packet there are data and the
ID of the node which has successfully sent the CTB. As said before this is the node who has
to forward the packet and to acknowledge it by sending an ACK to the source. This ensures
the reliability of the dissemination. Note that all nodes between also get the packets but do
not forward or acknowledge. If the ACK packet gets lost before the source receives it then
the source goes back to the first segment based iteration and starts again. But this can only
happen RETmax times.
4 Intersectional Broadcast
While disseminating the packet can be received by a repeater at an intersection and should
be forwarded in all road directions except the direction where the packet came from. At
intersections a repeater should always be the forwarder because of the best sight to the road.
When a node is the forwarder and there is no repeater inside the transmission range then a
normal directional broadcast is started as described before. But if the opportunity exists to
send to a repeater the node sends it via the normal point-to-point IEEE 802.11 protocol. The
positions of itself, repeaters and road segments are known by all nodes through their GPS
systems and digital road map. This protocol uses RTS,CTS,DATA,ACK according to the
UMB protocol. After receiving the broadcast the repeater starts the directional broadcasts
in all other directions.
There could also appear situations where packets pass road segments many times. These
loops should be avoided because of wasting band-width. There for the repeaters memorize
the packet IDs they have forwarded and do not initiate broadcast for packets they already
know. Another aspect is that bandwidth is lost because of nearby nodes which receive packets
that repeaters forward more than once. Especially for long data this could waste significant
bandwidth. So the UMB protocol has implemented a mechanism to decrease the waste: The
repeater does not send the information in the DATA packet if the corresponding node has
already overheared this packet. The corresponding node has only to set a bit in its CTB
packet so the source can recognize that it has not to send the information. However the
source has to send a short DATA packet to give the duty of forwarding to the corresponding
node.
5 Performance testing
The developers of the UMB protocol have tested it in a special simulation environment. They
have simulated the MAC Layer and Physical Layer with an event driven simulation library
(CSIM) and the vehicle movement and road layout with a separate Matlab simulation. To
get a good comparison to the UMB protocol they have modified the standard IEEE 802.11
Protocol to implement two other flooding based protocols. First there is 802.11-distance
where collisions try to be avoided by computing the waiting time - before forwarding a packet
- inversely proportional to the distance from the source. The waiting times are discrete
because of being multiples of the Slottime. Second there is 802.11-random where the waiting
time is randomly chosen between zero and the maximum Slottime. This two protocols have
also in common that every node has the duty to forward the received packets. To test these
three protocols on the road there are two road structures implemented, which you can see in
the following graphic.
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Figure 3: Road Structure I: one intersection, 1200 m x 1200 m
Figure 4: Road Structure II: four intersections, 2400 m x 2400m
A specified number of vehicles move on the road lanes with a constant speed. They do
not overtake, turn around or stand still. The cars are randomly placed with exponentially
distribution. Finally here are the simulation parameters the developers used to test their
protocol:
transmission range = 400m
data rate = 1 Mbps
frame body = 2312 bytes
base protocol 802.11b
maxSlot = 32
simulation time = 60s





Three metrics have been defined to compare the performance:
1. Success Percentage: Success Percentage of a packet is the number of cars which received
this packet divided through all cars in the simulation
2. Packet Dissemination Speed (m/s): Speed of a packet. Distance travelled by the packet
divided by the delay. The delay is the time elapsed since entering the source queue until
the packet is received by another node.
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3. Load Generated per Broadcast: The number of bits transmitted to send one packet to
the whole network. Total number of bits divided through total number of generated
packets. To consider the lost packets this value is also divided through the success
percentage.
In the following graphics you can see the testing results for different arrangements.
5.1 Arrangement 1
• Intersections: 1
• Average Vehicle Density: 10 / lane
• Total vehicle number: 61
As you can see the UMB success percentage is constantly near by 100 percent. Only if the
payload is high and the number of created packets increases some of them get lost. The two
other protocols decrease very fast with increasing the packet number because they have no
solution for the hidden node problem and their packets are not acknowledged by the receivers.
The UMB normalized average load is very low that shows that the channel is efficiently used
because of avoiding unnecessary multiple rebroadcasts. But the UMB protocol is slower in
dissemination speed than the two others as long the payload (DATA) is comparable to RTB,
CTB, and ACK overhead. If the DATA packet becomes longer the difference decreases to




• Average Vehicle Density: 33.3 / lane
• Total vehicle number: 160
When more vehicles are simulated you can observe that 802.11-randoms’ and 802.11-distances’
performance earlier decreases. The hidden node problem and the lack of acknowledgement
become more and more important. UMB makes no significant changes. The UMB normalized
average load keeps constant on a low good level because the forwarding duty is only at one
vehicle and not at every car as implemented by the two other protocols, which obviously get
a weaker performance because more cars have to re-broadcast more packets. Dissemination
speed decreases when packet generation increases. That seems to be because the packets
remain longer in the source queue and the sending rate is the bottle neck. If DATA is
long the worse performance of UMB gets much better and is comparable to the others. This
increase of the speed is a again a result of the comparison of the small overhead in comparison
to the transferred information.
5.3 Arrangement 3
• Intersections: 4
• Average Vehicle Density: 10 / lane
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(f) Packet dissemination speed
Figure 5: One intersection. Average vehicle density= 10 veh/km per lane. In (a), (b), (c)
payload is 100 bytes and in (d), (e), (f) the payload is 2312 bytes
• Total vehicle number: 190
Now in the third arrangement packet loops could appear so the repeaters are equipped with
a caching unit for the packet IDs. But because the effect of loops is avoided in the simulation
there is obviously no unexpected result of the new arrangement. Because the road structure
is bigger than in the one-intersection arrangements there are more cars on the street and so
more packets are produced and the normalized average load increases. That always decreases
the flooding based protocols’ performance and the success percentage decreases because of




• Average Vehicle Density: 33.3 / lane
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(f) Packet dissemination speed
Figure 6: One intersection. Average vehicle density= 33.3 veh/km per lane and payload=100
bytes. In (a), (b), (c) payload is 100 bytes and in (d), (e), (f) the payload is 2312 bytes
• Total vehicle number: 619
Because more vehicles produce more packets the success percentage decreases by all three
protocols. But the flooding based protocols are more affected because of the lack of control
mechanism as handshaking and acknowledging. And this leads to packet loss and collisions.
The normalized average load shows the same affection caused by the increasing vehicle den-
sity. At the packet dissemination speed you can see that for large DATA as seen before the
RTB/CTB/ACK-overhead nearly disappears in comparison to the DATA transmission.
6 Conclusion and opinion of the author about the source text
As seen in the last diagrams the UMB protocol has obviously not to fear a comparison
with flooding based protocols. In nearly all cases it is superior and shows a constant good
performance. Increasing the vehicle density and number of intersections only has moderate
effects. And because of giving the duty of forwarding to only one vehicle the protocol uses
the bandwidth very efficient. But there is an aspect which could speak against the use of this
protocol. First you have to install repeaters at every intersection which could be an economic
problem because it is expensive. The protocol should be extended through a version which
does not need the repeaters and as far as I read this work has already started. On the other
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(f) Packet dissemination speed
Figure 7: Four intersections. Average vehicle density= 10 veh/km per lane and payload=100
bytes. In (a), (b), (c) payload is 100 bytes and in (d), (e), (f) the payload is 2312 bytes
hand that would make it heavy to get such good performance and I am not convinced whether
the protocol would be reliable for complex road architecture. This should be tested in more
complex arrangements. Another aspect is that through the random parts of the protocol
and the many possible restarts it is nearly impossible to guarantee quality of service. What
I liked about my source text was the clear structure of the information and the scaling of
details. But in my opinion the whole thing could be explained on half of the pages. The
charts are too small and the differences cannot easily figured out. Anyway I had to use it
because I had no data to produce the charts. Beside of that the charts could hardly be
compared because of the arrangement on the paper. It is a pitty that they do not show the
effect of loops in their arrangements but only the absence. That makes the third and fourth
arrangement pritty senceless. They show very often and in detail the better performance of
UMB by explaining the lines in the diagrams. But for example why the dissemination speed
decreases by increasing the packet generation rate they do not explain. All in all they give a
good introduction in their protocol but keep some secrets.
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(f) Packet dissemination speed
Figure 8: Four intersections. Average vehicle density= 33.3 veh/km per lane, In (a), (b), (c)
payload is 100 bytes and in (d), (e), (f) the payload is 2312 bytes
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A new unicast routing technique for multi-hop wireless networks, called Extremely Op-
portunistic Routing (ExOR), is being illustrated in this paper. How can this technique
advantageously be used in vehicular ad-hoc networks and what are possible weaknesses
on the other hand?
1 Introduction
After a short introduction into unicast routing protocols, the differences between wired and
wireless networks and an overview of the IEEE standard, a new unicast routing technique
called Extremely Opportunistic Routing (ExOR) will be presented.
When a sender broadcasts a message, every receiver can listen and understand the sent mes-
sage. Talking about unicast routing technique in wireless means that the sender broadcasts
a message, and so every participant of the network can receive the packet, but the only one
who is interested in, who wants to know what or who is able to decode the message is the
addressed recipient.
Nearly every unicast routing protocol first chooses a path of nodes in the network in order
to send the data through this pre-determined path. These techniques make a lot of sense if
the underlying network is based on wired connections or each pair of nodes is only able to
exchange data when nodes are linked. In a multi-hop network there always is at least one
optimal route as long as every link has deterministic costs. A routing protocol is expected to
perform well whilst it uses the optimal route for sending its data.
Using this technology seems to be interesting in wireless networks too, but there are a few
major differences to care about between a wireless and a wired network. First of all, in a
wireless network every node can directly communicate over radio with another node, maybe
with a higher error rate. Another deviation is that all packets sent through radio are broad-
casted and therefore there is no need to target a specific node. Last, radio communication
between nodes is not deterministic; so packets sometimes do not arrive. In wired networks
properties making this pre-determined route performing well, may not hold in wireless.
With the possibility of sending and receiving data in Local Area Networks (LANs) without
any wires, speaking about wireless LAN, a new standard was published by the Institute for
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) in 1997. The IEEE 802.11 (WLAN) standard
was added next to the existing wired network standards, i.e. IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet), IEEE
802.4 (Token-Bus) and the IEEE 802.5 (Token-Ring). The WLAN standard has of course
been added and improved since its introduction. An 802.11 network is a system with a
cellular architecture that is subdivided into cells. The simplest scenario is the (mobile) ad-
hoc network functioning without any additional fixed infrastructure and where at least one
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computer builds the self-organizing wireless network. Adding (fixed) access points (APs),
which are usually connected with a distribution system (DS, in most of the cases an Ethernet),
an interconnected WLAN, in the Standard named as Extended Service Set (ESS), is set up.
A few ideas of how VANETs can benefit from ExOR and/or combinations are explained and
touched in 4.
2 The IEEE 802.11 Standard
In order to understand why slight changes in the Media Access Control layer in Extremely
Opportunistic Routing are necessary, later in 3.3, the 802.11 Standard is quickly refreshed.
The IEEE 802.11 protocol covers the Media Access Control (MAC) and the physical layer
(PHY), as any other 802.x protocol does. The Standard defines a single MAC which interacts
with, currently, four PHYs where all of them are running at one and two Mega bits per
second, two of them also at 5.5 up to 54 Mbps.
As the physical layer is exactly equivalent to the layer one (PHY layer) in the OSI-Model the
MAC only partly covers the OSI-layer two - the data link layer.
Figure 1: 802.11 in the OSI-model.
2.1 The physical layer
The wireless standard defines four PHYs however all have an interface to a uniform MAC
layer. The PHYs Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence Spread
Spectrum (DSSS) both interact in the 2.4 GHz band and the third in infrared. In 1999 the
Standard was extended by a PHY in the 5 GHz band called Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing (OFDM).
The physical layer of wireless LANs has to ensure that users can operate neatly and smoothly
as possible within the medium. Transmitting a bit correct and safe over the wireless from a
sender to a recipient is the main task of the PHY. So in this layer the specific transmission
medium and the modulation method are chosen to provide this task.
In order to supply an undisturbed transmission in an interference-prone medium the Spread
Spectrum Technology uses a much wider frequency range than really needed. Due to spread-
ing the signal with a code interference is reduced to a minimum.
Then, a bit is modulated on the electromagnetic wave where a harmonic wave is changed as
long as the transmission of a bit lasts in its amplitude, frequency or phase.
The third task is to regulate the access on the medium. Three mechanisms, Time Division
Multiple Access, Frequency Division Multiple Access and the Code Division Multiple Access,
help to solve the multiple-access problem.
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In the architecture directly under the MAC layer, the Physical Layer Convergence Proce-
dure (PLCP) sub-layer communicates with the MAC, administrates the Physical Medium
Dependent (PMD) sub-layer and extends frames received with important information for the
physical sending. The PMQ sub-layer realises transmission and reception over the wireless
medium with the respective technology and modulates or demodulates the frames.
2.2 The MAC layer
The MAC layer regulates the transmission of a whole message. Additionally to the key task,
the regulation of collision-free access to the medium, the 802.11 MAC performs other actions
that are usually done in upper layer protocols beyond the standard MAC protocols; such as
fragmentation, packet retransmission and acknowledgments.
Within MAC, two basis access methods exist, following a centralized and a decentralized idea.
The method based on the decentralized idea uses the Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA). In contrary to the other 802.x standards wireless cannot provide
collision detection, because of wireless characteristics. Implementing a collision detection
mechanism would need the implementation of full duplex radio. Since nodes cannot detect
collisions during transmission and distinguish collisions from other disturbances, collisions
have to be avoided in advance. A timer, called the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) regulates
Collision Avoidance.
A station wanting to transmit data senses the medium. If the medium is busy, the station
will delay its transmission, on the other hand if the medium is sensed free, the station has
the allowance to send its data (Carrier Sense). Since several nodes simultaneously try to
access the medium when they sense it free, collisions may appear where all sent data get lost
(Multiple Access). The function of collision avoidance bases on the NAV-value. Every station
stores the NAV in a special register and builds it on the Duration/ID field in the packet
header, see Figure 3. All stations receive this information due to broadcasting, so they know
how long transmissions will last and only try to send data when the NAV-value runs out.
Collisions and disturbances can still turn up and therefore successful receipts of data will be
communicated to the sender through acknowledgements (ACKs). If ACKs do not come, the
sender tries to send the data again after a specific timeout. Stations do only acknowledge
unicast packets since it would not make any sense doing the same with broadcast packets.
The 802.11 standard distinguishes between data frames, for data transmission between
users, control frames, for regulating the medium access, and management frames, such as
acknowledgments. Management frames have a higher priority than the others do, because
a station that sent some data needs an ACK within a certain time. After a transmission,
stations wait an appropriate interval between two following frames, before they try to reserve
the medium. Ensuring that management frames really have a higher priority than e.g. data
frames, different intervals, Interframe Space (IFS), exist. The most important is the Short
IFS (SIFS) and defines a minimum interval for ACKs and other management frames. Later
in the 3.2.2 we see that this is a very important interval that has to be changed in order to
implement this new routing protocol. If the SIFS passes by and the Distributed IFS (DIFS)
expires as well, a node can now gain access to the medium in order to sending its data after
a short random back off.
Another situation for collision that may occur is called the hidden state problem (Figure 2.
As we already know, when one node occupies the medium, all other nodes in the range of
the occupying node have to wait. The hidden state problem is a mistaken recognition of
free medium although someone else already occupies the medium. This situation happens
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Figure 2: The hidden state problem.
when a node C does not lie in the same range as node A and vice versa. Node B connects
both of them. Let us assume that A wants to send a message to B, because the medium is
sensed free and all other collision avoidance criteria are fulfilled. However, in truth C tries or
already transmits data to B, as a consequence medium is not free and a collision occurs at B.
Therefore, A sends a request to B, where A is granting access for the medium for a specific
duration. B hears this Request-To-Send (RTS) frame and sends back an allowance if medium
is free and B is ready. This Clear-To-Send (CTS) frame again contains the duration so every
other node will hear and update its NAV.
The most general MAC layer frame format in an ad-hoc network and a frame format for an
acknowledgment are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Data and Acknowledgment frame format in the MAC layer.
3 Contribution of the Paper: The ExOR Routing Technique
Extremely Opportunistic Routing is a unicast routing technique for multi-hop wireless net-
works which reduces the quantity of transmissions and is a protocol that wants to benefit
from the wireless’ characteristics. Each packet is forwarded through a sequence of nodes,
where the ExOR determines the next node closest to destination forwarding the packet from
all the nodes that have successfully received the packet. This behaviour skips numerous hops
in multi-hop path which finally reduces the number of transmissions up to 65 % compared to
the best possible pre-determined path routing. Important to realize is that ExOR does not
predetermine the path ahead of sending the data, but during the sending process.
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The most important ambition of ExOR is to ensure that only one receiver forwards the packet
and that it is the receiver closest to destination.
3.1 The Protocol
The ExOR protocol is split into three stages. Each node in the network has a loss rate matrix
for direct radio transmission between every pair of nodes. This matrix is updated periodically
and generally built with a link-state flooding scheme.
The three stages are repeated so many times until the packet reaches its final destination.
3.2 The Protocol
The ExOR protocol is split into three stages. Each node in the network has a loss rate matrix
for direct radio transmission between every pair of nodes. This matrix is updated periodically
and generally built with a link-state flooding scheme.
The three stages are repeated so many times until the packet reaches its final destination.
3.2.1 Stage 1: Selection of the candidate forwarder set
The achieved, good performance of ExOR resides on the ability choosing a prioritized can-
didate set of nodes which can transport the packet closer to its destination. Selecting the
forwarding candidates is based on the shortest number of hops and longest hops. The sender
first looks for the shortest way to the destination node where equal paths have to compete
with their delivery ratio. The highest priority in the candidate set receives the node that is
the closest to destination. The sender writes this list in the package header - once again, the
candidates are prioritized by distance. As soon as the first node is set, the ExOR deletes this
Figure 4: A simple network example, with delivery ratios.
highest priority candidate from the loss rate matrix and searches for the shortest path again.
Then the first hop from this new shortest path is the candidate with the second priority. This
procedure is repeated until all remaining positions in the candidate set are fixed. The candi-
date set is cached until the delivery ratio matrix is updated with its new values. Especially
at changes of the topology, when nodes join or disappear in the network, the measures of loss
rates and the flood statistics are updated.
A simple example is shown in Figure 4 where the sender A wants to transmit a packet to
C. In this example, the candidate set size is three. D is the highest priority node due to
its longest hop. Node A deletes node D from its delivery loss rate matrix and repeats the
procedure. Then, A chooses C as the most important node in this new shortest path, so C
receives second highest priority looking at all nodes. At the end, node B gets weakest priority.
Finally, the candidate set is [D, C, B].
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3.2.2 Stage 2: Acknowledging transmissions
Remember that one of the most important goals in ExOR is that only one receiver should
forward the packet. But how can it be guaranteed and how do all nodes agree who is the
next sender of the packet? Due to the fact that not every node from the candidate set
receives the packet from the original sender, there must be a way that every node knows if
he is the lucky one to send it. The solution is that a node broadcasts an acknowledgment
(ACK) for successfully receiving the packet. As seen before the MAC in the 802.11 standard
only provides a simple acknowledgment that replies: ”‘Yes I got it.”’ This simple ACK is
not sufficient for choosing the forwarder; therefore the MAC from 802.11 must be modified.
An acknowledgment must contain more information and the modified MAC has to reserve
multiple slots of time to return an ACK. Why is it? Time between a SIFS and the next
longer IFS is only long enough for returning one ACK and afterwards other data can be sent.
However, we have a candidate set size of n members and all of them have to acknowledge
the receipt of the packet. Consequently, to provide the possibility that n members are able
to reply and no collisions are provoked, the answer interval has to be stretched. Therefore,
we need something more than n times the ACK-transmitting time plus n times the time of a
SIFS for guaranteeing the whole ACK sequence.
According to its position in the candidate set, the candidate delays the transmission of the
ACK. So a node X sends an ACK with the ID of the highest priority successful recipient Y
known to X. Before a candidate forwards the packet, he is listening to all ACK slots to know
if there is a candidate that has a higher priority and therefore will be the forwarder. The
fact that every member of the candidate set sends an ACK containing the ID of the highest-
priority ACK sender heard until he had to send the ACK suppresses multiple forwarding.
Now one might think: ”‘What happens if a candidate X with a low priority does not hear
each or especially higher prioritized ACKs?”’
A further example illustrates that it does not matter. Assume that node A reads in a received
packet that it is the highest-priority nominee. Recipient A immediately sends an ACK with
its ID in it. B, the one with the second highest priority, does not get A’s ACK, but a further
candidate C receives the acknowledgment from A. After C’s time slot B receives the ACK
from C. If there was no modified MAC, B would now decide to be the forwarder and thus A
and B would forward the packet. But luckily our ACKs do contain IDs; B indirectly knows
through C’s ACK that A also got the transmission.
Figure 5: ExOR acknowledging sequence.
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3.2.3 Stage 3: Decision of forwarding a received packet
Finally when the time slots for acknowledging the reception end up, each candidate locally
decides with its information whether to forward the packet or sort it out. When the node
decides to forward the packet because it has only received ACKs with lower priorities, it
replaces the candidate set in the ExOR frame header with its new one. And finally transmits
the packet.
Even though we have such a good protocol, sometimes a packet is transmitted more than
once owing to acknowledgment reception failure. Each packet therefore contains a random
nonce which the forwarding nodes store in their cache. Transmission is clear if the nonce is
not stored in the nodes cache. As a result, a node will never send a packet multiple times as
long it is not an explicit retransmission due to ACK failure.
3.3 Changes needed in the MAC Protocol
As already touched on, the Media Access Control from the 802.11 standard must be changed
in a few details.
The data and the acknowledgment frame format have to be modified in the context of the
Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) frame. The frame control field has to indicate
Figure 6: Modified MAC frame formats in ExOR.
that in spite of a standard an ExOR frame format follows; concretely a data or acknowl-
edgment frame format. The two duration bytes in the data frame format will also allocate
the time needed for multiple acknowledgments in the Network Allocation Vector. The time
indicated in the Duration field, which every node in the network stores in the NAV is as
much longer than the plain data transmission time as to provide to all forwarding candidates
time enough to send their ACK. With adding the ACK sequence to data transmission time,
explained in 3.2.2, prevents that other nodes lying in the same radio radius will not try to
reserve the wireless medium for themselves too early.
Further the data frame format provides information about the candidate set, which is listed
by priority. The packet’s nonce with 4 bytes differs as well from the standard.
Due to short reply time slots, the acknowledgment frame format cannot be too big and thus
only contains minimal changes that have the desired effect as described in section 3.2.2. One
is the sender address of the data frame format. The second change is the position of the node
in the candidate set belonging to the highest priority ACK heard so far.
The ExOR produces an overhead to the 802.11 Standard, but not a significant one and is cut
out by far by its improvement.
Time of an ExOR data frame and acknowledgments is 8.3 % longer than unicast 802.11. The
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physical layer operates at i.e. 6 Mbps with a SIFS time of 16 µs, preamble and PLCP header
duration of 20 µs and 4 µs. The payload is a 1500 byte frame and the data frame has four
candidates. The table in Figure 7 compares the transmission times.
Figure 7: Transmission times for each type of frame and in total.
3.4 Evaluation and Simulation Results
Biswas and Morris, the authors of the paper [MoBi03], developed a simulation environment
that models a multi-hop wireless network and its operating. The goal was to model a large,
in respect of the diameter, network for getting a better impression of ExOR compared to
the best possible pre-determined routing protocol. In this simulation environment they had
the exact information about the delivery ratio and randomly placed 100 nodes in a plane
seized 50x50 sq ft, which is about 15x15 square meters. Delivery ratio between nodes base on
measures of the distance-to-delivery relationship in the work of Ganesan et al., [WCEG+02]
using medium transmission power. The distribution of packet reception rate over distance is
non-uniform. The distribution of packet delivery rate over distance shows that probability
of packet reception decreases almost linearly over distance rather than inverse-square, see
Figure 8. In other situations or scenarios there can of course be other distributions, which
might show a much bigger decrease than inverse-square. These details shall be enough for
the moment as it goes too far in other topics - not used in this context here and import to
understand now. Looking at the resulting distribution shows that ExOR performs well and
Figure 8: Delivery ratio vs distance using medium power (and in simulation).
even does when an inverse-square approximation is chosen. In cases where the falloff will be
too big, the benefit of ExOR diminishes a lot due to the lack of long-distance links.
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They assume all nodes are stationary during the simulation and therefore the delivery-ratio
matrix (DRM) remains unchanged from the beginning to the end.
Leaving any radio propagation effects and packet-size-correlated losses aside - random losses
of packets are only based on the delivery ratio. A packet is transmitted maximally 8 times.
The rival of the ExOR path is the best possible pre-determined path, both do perfectly know
Figure 9: Number of transmission averaged over all pairs of nodes required to route a packet
from source to destination.
the DRM and are both supplied with the identical DRM. For comparing ExOR with the best
possible pre-determined path, they ran Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm in order to deter-
mine the total number of transmissions required on average to sending and acknowledging
packets along a given route.
Biswas and Morris were focusing on the total number of transmissions between all pairs of
nodes and the distribution of links used by both approaches.
In Figure 9 the average number of transmissions required to route 100 packets between every
pair of nodes in the system, where ExOR uses a candidate set of eight members.
ExOR habitually performs much better and this up to 55 %. In even longer networks im-
provement up to 65 % are possible. This confirms that opportunistic routing really skips most
short and intermediate hops. As in Figure 10 presented, the next survey is the distribution
of successful transmission distances. This experiment contained 50 node pairs where we are
looking at the five nodes farthest on either side of the network. Excluding short distances
enables the plot to show us that ExOR forwards packets much farther than the best possible
pre-determined route protocol.
4 Assessment and Conclusion
Event though ExOR is only simulated, Biswas and Morris plan to implement ExOR on
hardware and are still negotiating for getting access to 802.11 MAC layer firmware, ExOR
seems to work really efficiently. The very short simulation and evaluation section lets shining
through that it is likely to perform well in real wireless networks and not only in simulation.
Nevertheless, the fact ExOR simulation and experimentation were not caring about packet
size rise a uncertainty about performance later on in real action as well as they were just
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Figure 10: Histogramm of transmission distances using ExOR and the best possible pre-
determined routes.
simulating a plane of 50x50 sq ft. Criticising or even rating the paper is very difficult
because the very important - evaluation, simulation and related work, are kept very short
and information is put too concisely.
ExOR is definitely not a custom made protocol for VANETs, but its strengths are really
worth considering implementing this unicast routing protocol in cars. As explained in fore-
going sections the reduction of the number of transmissions for communication between the
source and destination is an important improvement. Especially because in VANETs longer
distances has to be served and bandwidth decreases as distance-supply increases.
Power supply is a criterion too, but in cars high transmission power is realizable. VANETs
would really profit from the fact that packets are not transmitted multiple times any more.
Those multiple sent packets can be used for sending other data instead. Forwarding acknowl-
edgments could also ensure that the aimed car received the packet and show, which other cars
did as well. If the acknowledgement reaches the original sender with all candidates stored in
it, it would never trigger a new transmission of this information to one of those candidates
again. This could be interesting in a candidate set - where every candidate needs the in-
formation, i.e. icy roads, and so the protocol almost acts like a multicast routing protocol.
Nevertheless a standalone ExOR would not be a very good solution. Combination with a
Global Positioning System (GPS) or with something like a braided multi-path routing could
improve its reliability. Knowledge about the topology of the network would help a lot and
could even increase reliability of transmissions up to its physical limits. Combining ExOR
with the perfect knowledge of the geographic topology might enhance the chance to find real
good forwarding candidates. Access points or an on-board computing unit with an integrated
GPS could supply this geographic information.
Why improving reliability when reliability is already excitingly good? Firstly, cars are chang-
ing the position in their ”‘plane”́ and are not standing still as Biswas and Morris assumed
in their simulation. Maybe in a special case, a situation shows up where cars are relatively
not moving among them but geographical they do, e.g. all of them are driving in the same
direction with almost same velocity on the same highway-lane. However, everybody under-
stands that there are too many scenarios not fulfilling these idealistic assumptions taken in
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their simulation. In reality, conditions are neither stable nor constant and the networks are
not only something like 50 times 50 square feet big, but networks are weird areas that do not
meet mathematically proper forms.
As we know, that ExOR depends on its DRM and therefore on the topology of the network, a
new question turns up. Is ExOR’s benefit still big enough to strike out the incessant intensive
computation of the link-state graph and DRM needed at big changes to the network?
An approach could be a classification of the network, e.g. classifying all cars moving in the
same direction to the same class, in order to reduce the exhaustive computing. Maybe too
big changes and node failure due to geographical position changes could be diminished.
At the beginning of VANET, there will be too few cars to benefit from ExOR compared to
a routing with the best possible pre-determined path, but later on having a good saturation
of cars using wireless; benefit will almost hit the roof. In the beginning it will be even very
hard to keep alive a network somewhere out on highways, in hilly areas or simply were not a
lot of cars are driving around.
Talking about weaknesses means also to have a look at the tricky candidate selection. Can-
didates will be selected as in theory, maybe with a slight change that choosing candidates
will be selected from a classified set of nodes, but lets have a look at following situation. On
a highway with a lot of tunnels and leading through semi-open area, such as a narrow and
hilly topology, the transmission range of a 2 Mbps wireless will lessen from about 400 m, in
an open topology, to 90 or even 40 meters. Now having computed the link-state graph, a
node from the graph suddenly disappears, so this node will not be addressable. Worse is, in
the same situation, if a node failure takes place when the prioritized candidate acknowledges
the reception of the packet and every other candidate throws the packet away. Right at that
moment the candidate, selected as the forwarder, reaches a tunnel, fails or is suddenly out of
range of any network the packet will be lost. It can be too late until the original sender rec-
ognizes this. The best pre-determined path algorithm has the same problem, but our interest
is how could be ExOR put in VANETs. Maybe it would make sense to have some backup
paths that contain other nodes than the original path. Exactly this node failure demands
for an additional backing, maybe the mentioned multi-path routing - called on temporarily -
could support ExOR routing in hard environment.
As we see there still has to be done a lot of work with implementing, simulating and testing
in order to deploy it commercially in VANETs. A combination of ExOR with one or more
other protocols that strike ExOR’s weaknesses out will surely result in an extremely good
and stable routing.
First, I had to read the paper several times until I began to understand all the details and how
it really works. I like the way they wrote the paper. The paper is - in my opinion - sometimes
a bit confusing, because they easy understandable facts several times and very important and
hard stuff only short. At the beginning I thought that the topic is very boring, but now I
really like this topic and can also image to go deeper and further in this topic. Especially
when combining ExOR with geographical methods. I hope that I could bring you their paper
and my thoughts a bit closer and you like my work.
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